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  I 
Abstract 
The extant management accounting literature shows that there is little consensus on 
why and how change in management accounting systems (MAS) evolves within 
organisations over time (Burns and Vaivio, 2001) and especially how the change 
process can be conceptualised into a theoretical model (Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
Although Amat et al. (1994) have provided a better understanding of MAS change 
over time and successfully conceptualised the process into a model using the notion of 
dualism, they noted that the evidence of a single case study is not enough.  However, 
there has been no further study to extend Amat et al.’s (1994) findings.  This thesis 
resembles Amat et al.’s (1994) study, analysing the progressive formalisation of MAS 
in a Chinese company: Shanghai Light Industry Machinery Stock Company Limited, 
during periods of change at both the social and organisational levels. 
 
It was found that three outer, social factors (socio-economic condition, competition 
and socio-culture) and three inner, organisational ones (autonomy, profitability and 
authority) have greatly impacted on the progressive formalisation of the MAS in the 
Chinese company during the period studied.  Also, the internal effects on the MAS 
change differ from the external ones, mostly reflecting the increasingly specialised 
managers in the company having exercised a set of proactive or intentional changes in 
the MAS within the corporate boundary. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
            
Research on change in management accounting systems (MAS) and controls in their 
social and organisational context has become one of the major topics in the 
Anglo-Saxon management accounting literature since the 1990s (Williams and 
Seaman, 2002; Burns and Scapens, 2000).  In recent years, increasing research 
attention has also been given to studying MAS change in the context of transition 
economies (see, e.g. Southworth, 1994; Bailey, 1995; Vamosi, 2000; Luther and 
Longden, 2001).  Most of the studies on MAS change in a radically changing nation 
have explored a set of fundamental issues of why MAS takes the form it does, why 
MAS changes come about and what key interrelated factors (internal and external) 
there are (Amat et al., 1994). 
 
However, “the available literature has mainly stressed the existence [of] or change in 
MAS as the consequence of either external or internal factors to the 
organisation…These authors neglect the dualistic nature of organisations and 
accounting in organisations…” (Amat et al., 1994, p.118).  The notion of dualism and 
the dualism model proposed by Amat et al. (1994) supplement the extant management 
accounting literature regarding the complex task of how MAS change can be 
conceptualised into a theoretical model (Burns and Scapens, 2000).  Although Amat 
et al. (1994) argued that their model may be more useful for future studies of MAS 
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change in the context of radically changing nations, there is no further research to 
extend Amat et al.’s (1994) findings.   
 
This study draws upon the framework of dualism and follows the dualism model to 
explore the contextual aspects that have resulted in the existence of or changes in MAS 
in a Chinese setting.  The review of prior studies shows that few studies have been 
undertaken in China to constitute a comprehensive understanding of the process of 
introducing, facilitating and restructuring MAS over time at both social and 
organisational levels.  This study proposes to at least partially fill this gap by 
discussing the case of Shanghai Light Industry Machinery Stock Company Limited 
(SLIMSC).    This study will explore the interplay of factors between the social and 
the organisational changes that have impacted significantly on the role of MAS at 
SLIMSC over the last more than forty years. 
 
Chapter 2 theoretically reviews prior research approaches adopted in studying MAS 
change and presents criticisms of those studies as a way of understanding MAS 
change.  Prior studies of MAS change in transition economies are also reviewed. 
Furthermore, the notion of dualism and the dualism model, proposed by Amat et al. 
(1994), are described and interpreted.   Several problems in the extant management 
accounting literature are identified.  Although the notion of dualism and the dualism 
model attempt to resolve the problems in the extant management accounting literature, 
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there is no further study to extend Amat et al.’s (1994) findings to other radically 
changing nations.  This becomes the key research objective of this study. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the research focus and outlines the research questions to achieve 
the research objective.  Also, the research method and specific research techniques 
serving to accomplish a qualitative case study are described.  The data collection 
process carried out in the company studied is detailed.  
 
Chapter 4 briefly reviews China’s economic reform over the last twenty years.  The 
reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises is also described by reviewing Huang et 
al.’s (1998) study.  The history of SLIMSC, over the last more than forty years, is 
described. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the findings through illustrations of the process of MAS change in 
SLIMSC during 1956-2004.  Following the model of dualism discussed in Chapter 2, 
this chapter classifies the MAS change in SLIMSC into four stages, by linking MAS 
change with the respective changes at both the social and organisational levels in each 
period. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the findings and identifies the key social and organisational 
change factors affecting MAS change in SLIMSC during 1956-2004.  In comparison 
with Amat et al.’s (1994) findings, the similarities of and differences between the two 
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studies are discussed.  The final conclusion is drawn followed by the discussion of 
the new MAS change model according to the case of SLIMSC. 
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Chapter 2: Literature survey 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will theoretically review recent studies of contextual aspects of change in 
MAS, then critically discuss the frameworks those studies have drawn upon.  Also, 
the notion of dualism and the dualism model, as argued by Amat et al. (1994), helping 
to analyse the process of design, implementation and change in MAS, will be 
described and interpreted.   
 
According to Amat et al. (1994), studies based on the dualism model can present a 
comprehensive picture of MAS change at both social and organisational levels and 
over a long time period, in particular in radically changing nations.  In this respect, 
the second section will review prior studies of MAS change in transition economies, 
identifying a list of changing factors affecting MAS change in the radically changing 
nations.  
 
The third section will outline some problems identified in the extant management 
accounting literature concerning the issue of a contextual understanding of MAS 
change.  This study will therefore adopt the model of dualism to extend Amat et al.’s 
(1994) study to a Chinese setting.  
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2.2. The theoretical framework drawn on 
 
2.2.1. Studies of contextual aspects of change in MAS: a general review 
Since the late 1970s there has been a growing interest in studying the context in 
which MAS operate…The available literature has mainly stressed the existence 
[of] or change in MAS as the consequence of either external or internal factors 
to the organisation…These authors, however, neglect the dualistic nature of 
organisations and accounting in organisations… (Amat et al., 1994, p.118) 
It has been widely acknowledged that there is a significant link between MAS and the 
context in which MAS operate (see e.g. Kaplan, 1985; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; 
Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Amat et al., 1994).  MAS and controls, which are often 
perceived as an environmentally determined activity (Gilling, 1976), do or will have 
to change as environmental circumstance change (Foster and Ward, 1994) at both the 
social and the organisational levels (Amat et al., 1994). 
Studies of contextual aspects of MAS change are often carried out through the factor 
approach (Anderson and Young, 1999) which aims to present a list of broad external 
and internal factors impacting on the MAS change (Granlund, 2001).  Those factors, 
such as technological developments, the production of knowledge, level of 
competition, changes in corporate governance and strategy and changes in managerial 
needs, have often been recognised as and subsequently been proven to be the major 
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causes affecting MAS change (Anderson and Young, 1999).  The factor approach 
relates to various theories in the context of organisation theory, for instance the 
“adaptionist” approach considering organisational change as a consequence of 
environmental adaptation or the “interventionist” approach viewing organisational 
change as a “planned innovation” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996, p.14).   
Following the factor approach, recent studies of MAS change have drawn upon two 
main frameworks.  They are contingency theory and institutional theory.  It has been 
argued, however, that contingency theory studies are outcome orientated, searching for 
explanations or patterns of best fit on MAS change at a certain point of time (Soin et al., 
2002), whereas the nature of the change is certainly an evolutionary process over a 
period of time (Van de Ven and Poole, 1988), for instance, “management accounting 
change as a process” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.4).  Therefore, the contingency 
theory studies only provide a static picture of the contextual factors affecting MAS 
change, and the relevant evidence is limited to some particular time period in the 
context studied.   
 
Drawing upon the framework of institutional theory, Roberts and Scapens (1985) 
argued that a contextual understanding of the process of MAS change can be 
established by discovering what has been changed in the roles of MAS at the 
organisation over the period.  Furthermore, Scapens and Roberts (1993) extended their 
study of MAS change, concluding that the causes of the process of MAS change over 
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time were various historical contingencies taking place within and outside the 
organisation.  This conclusion accords with the view of Giddens (1981) concerning the 
historical and contingent nature of all social reproduction processes.   
However, MAS can also be analysed from a cultural perspective, and a contextual 
understanding of MAS change can be established by linking them to the changes that 
have taken place among people (Amat et al., 1994).  This view can be compared to 
Gray’s (1988) theoretical model of socio-cultural influence on the development of 
accounting systems.  Gray (1988) noted that culture or societal values will change in 
practice as a result of either short-term (e.g. technological change) or long-term (e.g. 
ideological change) shifts in physical environmental circumstances; accordingly, 
changes in accounting values or attitudes of accountants derived from the changing 
culture or societal values will, in turn, impact significantly on the process of 
accounting system change.  Amat et al. (1994) argued that because of the impact of 
different national cultures, MAS are often designed and implemented in contexts 
which are different from those in which they were developed.   
 
Furthermore, some recent studies of MAS change are undertaken based on the notion 
of “diffusion” (Lin and Yu, 2002) which suggests that innovative management 
practices or knowledge (e.g. the Japanese total quality management practice or the 
western activity-based costing methods) can be diffused from one firm to another 
within the industrialised world (see. e.g. Drury and Tayles, 1994; Kaplan, 1998), or 
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from developed countries to developing countries (see. e.g. Firth, 1996; Lin and Yu, 
2002).  Under the notion of diffusion, the transfer of innovative knowledge between 
corporate boundaries is the key effect on MAS change.  
Despite the various research approaches that have been adopted in the recent studies 
of contextual aspects of MAS change, there is little consensus on why and how MAS 
change evolves within organisations over time (Burns and Vaivio, 2001), and 
especially how the change process can be conceptualised into a theoretical model 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000).  As Hopwood (1987, p.207) commented:  
Unfortunately, very little is known of the processes of accounting change.  As 
of now we have only a limited understanding of the conditions which provide the 
possibility for particular conceptions of the accounting craft, the forces that put 
accounting into motion, the processes accompanying accounting elaboration and 
diffusion, and the varied human, organisational and social consequences that can 
stem from changing accounting regimes. 
 
Even recently, this lack of understanding is still present (Briers and Chua, 2001) and the 
literature is still in its infancy (Malmi, 1999). 
 
Some recent studies (see, e.g., Amat et al., 1994; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Soin et al., 
2002) attempted to conceptualise MAS change with a process view, in which 
organisational and environmental dynamics interact with each other.  Amat et al. 
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(1994) and Soin et al. (2002) further argued that, although many prior studies have 
recognised the linkages between MAS and either the external or the internal 
environment, they neglect the dualistic nature of organisations and MAS in 
organisations.  These viewpoints are, by and large, informed by Gidden’s (1984) 
structuration theory, which argues that explanations of the interrelation of MAS 
change, organisational change and social change are often formed in a dualistic 
configuration (Giddens, 1990). 
 
2.2.2. The notion of dualism and its importance 
 
The dualistic configuration, according to Giddens (1990), is constituted as the 
correlation of, or difference between, the existing function of the MAS as a form of 
representation of organisational realities as well as of society on the one hand, and the 
notion of the organisation as a complex ontological entity on the other hand.   That is 
to say, as Amat et al. (1994, p.118) further illustrated, one side of an organisation 
deals with the impact of external wider factors (social, economic, political and legal) 
that lead to MAS development; however, another side of the organisation is “looking 
inward” and focusing on the relationship between internal changing indicators “within 
the corporate boundary”, which becomes another major force driving MAS to change.  
Such a viewpoint can also be linked to the resource dependence model (Pfeiffer and 
Salancik, 1978) which argues that, as organisations are dependent on the environment 
for resources, they may manipulate the environment through internal managerial 
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proactive endeavours in order to reduce dependence.  Hence, the implementation and 
change of MAS is not only a response of the organisation to external pressures, but 
also purposefully initiated by the organisational individuals acting on the “planned 
innovation” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996, p.14). 
 
Amat et al. (1994) illustrated the notion of dualism through their study of the contextual 
aspects of MAS change at a Spanish company, DERESA.  They argued, “There is a 
double-sidedness or dualism in the environments inside and outside the organisation 
which should be taken into account when explaining the process of design, 
implementation and change of MAS” (p.120) in radically changing countries.  They 
concluded that “the interactions of two outer elements (competition and social/political 
control) with three inner ones (profitability, authority and span of control)” (p.119) 
greatly impacted on the roles of the MAS, which had led to a more formalised system 
(see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1  MAS and inner and outer variables 
Social 
 
Competition:   Stable       Dynamic 
Social Control:   High       Low    
       Organisational 
 
Profitability:  High      Low 
Authority:     Paternalism     Professionalism 
Span of Control:  Small       Large 
                           MAS 
 
Informal MAS                                           Formalised MAS 
Source: Adapted from Amat et al., 1994, p.119 
 
Nevertheless, Amat et al. (1994) noted that their model of dualism, with the five 
multi-layered variables, is based on a single case study in Spain.  There is therefore 
scope for extending the study to other national settings, in particular, to other radically 
changing nations.   
 
Recently there have been an increasing number of studies of MAS change undertaken 
in the context of rapidly changing nations, most notably of transition economies (see, 
e.g. Southworth, 1994; Bailey, 1995; Vamosi, 2000; Luther and Longden, 2001).  
Also, the importance of the dualistic nature of organisations and MAS in organisations 
has been increasingly recognised by researchers (see. e.g. Sturdy and Morgan, 2000; 
Soin et al., 2002, Lin and Yu, 2002).  However, as will be shown in the literature 
review in the next section, there is no study drawing upon the notion of dualism to 
extend Amat et al.’s (1994) findings.  
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2.3. Review of prior research on the MAS change in transition economies 
 
2.3.1 Studies of MAS change drawing upon European evidence 
 
In a discussion of accounting issues regarding the transition from planned to market 
economies in Central European countries, Gray and Roberts (1991, p.46) identified 
some “scope for investigating the nature and impact of changes in the accounting and 
control systems used.”  Jaruga (1996) and Garrod and McLeay (1996) found increased 
use of management accounting methods to support decision making in Central 
European countries during the transition.  
 
Vamosi (2000) examined how the interpretation of new concepts and ideas affected 
management accounting in a Hungarian, previously government-owned company.  He 
found that to a large extent change in accounting practice at the Hungarian company 
was a consequence of rapid changes in the external environment.  However, Vamosi 
(2000) does not present the key factors affecting MAS change at either the social or the 
organisational level in the Hungarian setting.  
 
Conversely, Szychta (2002) presented eight contingent factors that determined the 
change in the scope and intensity of MAS in Poland from 1998 to 1999.  They were: 
(1) changes in accounting legislation and laws; (2) increased competition; (3) the 
impact of changes in the international economy; (4) changes in the form of business 
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ownership; (5) new business entities with foreign capital; (6) the development of the 
money market; (7) new information technologies; and (8) the acquisition of knowledge 
by managers.   
 
Haldma and Lääts (2002) confirmed Szychta’s (2002) findings with regard to the eight 
influencing contingencies in examining the change in management accounting 
practices of Estonian manufacturing companies.  They added to Szychta’s (2002) 
findings by classifying changes in management accounting practices associated with 
shifts in the business and accounting environment as external contingencies, and those 
in technology and organisational aspects as internal contingencies. 
 
2.3.2 Relevant studies developed outside Europe 
 
Hoque and Hopper (1994) documented the debilitating effects of political volatility and 
acute economic problems in Bangladesh on firms' use of formal management control 
practices.   
 
Anderson and Lanen (1999) presented a broad overview of changes in management 
accounting practices that appeared to be associated with the economic reforms that took 
place in India in 1991.  They found that increased competition, an increased level of 
delegation in strategic processes and increased internationalisation were main factors 
affecting changes in management accounting practices of Indian firms in 1991. 
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Luther and Longden (2001) reported management accounting techniques in South 
Africa over the period of 1996 to 2002.  They found that changes in those techniques 
over the period were affected dramatically by the rapidly changing political and cultural 
environment.  Their research endorsed prior findings relating to contingent factors 
influencing management accounting change but also identified five new factors in 
South Africa:  increased uncertainty of the economic environment, the availability of 
competent staff, the removal of trade barriers, the increased cost of inputs and changes 
in stakeholder pressure.   
 
Prior Chinese-based studies (covering mainland China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Taiwan) of management accounting techniques and practices take 
mostly a cultural perspective (see. e.g. O’Connor, 1995; Chow et al., 1997; Brewer, 
1998; Chow et al., 2000; Tan, 2002).  The majority of these studies are based on 
Hofstede’s (1991, 1993) five cultural dimensions, exploring and explaining the 
similarities and differences between westerners and Chinese in an organisational 
context, and thus the different forms that MAS take.  Nevertheless, none of these 
studies have explored the influence of cultural shifts on the development of MAS 
within either corporate or national boundaries.   
 
There are, however, several China-related studies regarding the issue of management 
accounting change during the rapid socio-economic change in China.  Skousen and 
Yang (1988) theoretically reviewed the development of the Chinese management 
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accounting system during 1950-1985 and illustrated profit centre and investment centre 
accounting in Chinese enterprises during the early reform.  They argued that the 
Chinese reform policies, which “enlivened the domestic economy” and “opened 
[China] to the outside world” (p.206), resulted in various western management 
accounting methods and practices being introduced and implemented at Chinese 
enterprises.  Thus, they claimed, the quality of managerial decision-making had been 
improved and the level of productivity had increased dramatically in China by the mid- 
1980s. 
 
Scapens and Yan (1993) illustrated responsibility accounting systems in China before 
the 1990s and compared the socio-economic systems of China and the west.  They 
concluded that Chinese business and academic societies had a great desire to learn new 
management accounting procedures from the west as a response to the further reform.  
Jefferson and Rawski (1994) pointed to the importance of the emergence of competitive 
markets on the China mainland as a potent force for change in management behaviour 
and accounting system in many Chinese SOEs.  Tapen (1995) explained why western 
accounting concepts and methods were needed by Chinese enterprises in the 1990s 
since the conventional Chinese accounting system, characteristically a material 
production system, failed to keep up with the pace of economic reforms, particularly 
when the Chinese started trading with the west and allowed western multinationals to 
do business in local markets. 
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Firth (1996) provided descriptive evidence of changes in management accounting 
practices following economic reforms in China.  However, Firth’s survey study 
revealed that the application of western management accounting in China was still 
limited, and mainly restricted to joint ventures with foreign capital.   In addition, the 
small number of accounting procedures that were similar to western management 
accounting had played different roles in the management process in Chinese 
enterprises.  Firth (1996) concluded that the diffusion of western management 
accounting to China would be a slow process even if it were necessary and possible for 
Chinese enterprises to adopt western management accounting practices in the changing 
social and economic environment. 
 
In contrast, using the same research approach as Firth’s (1996), Lin and Yu (2002) 
reported that a Chinese steel company had successfully adopted a westernised 
responsibility cost control system resulting in dramatic cost reduction and profitability 
increases because of the effective control mechanisms.  They further argued that 
western management accounting procedures and practices could play a positive role in 
improving business management and profitability in China as well as in other transition 
economies.  
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2.4 The problems identified in the current management accounting literature 
 
The literature review presented in the previous sections suggests that there are several 
problems in the current management accounting literature in regard to the issue of 
contextual aspects of MAS change.  These problems are as follows, 
1. In general, the extant literature shows that there is little consensus on why and how 
MAS change evolves within organisations over time and especially how the change 
process can be conceptualised into a theoretical model.  This problem might 
result from the researchers’ holding different views on the nature of the social, 
organisational and MAS change and their having adopted different research 
approaches drawing upon different frameworks.   
2. Although Amat et al. (1994) have provided a better understanding of MAS change 
over time and successfully conceptualised the process into a model using the 
notion of dualism, the evidence of a single case study is not enough.  However, 
there has been no further study to extend Amat et al.’s (1994) findings. 
3. The majority of the prior studies of MAS change in the context of transition 
economies has used the contingent approach.  This literature not only provides a 
static picture of MAS change in transition economies, but also is limited to a 
particular point in time in the nations studied.   
Chapter 2: Literature survey  2-15 
4. The prior China-related studies were mainly developed through the cultural 
comparison model; also, the evidence drawn upon is fairly out-of-date (mainly 
before 1996) whereas further, more rapid change both within the Chinese 
organisations and in Chinese society has been taking place since then.  
 
In recognition of the above problems, this study resembles Amat et al.’s (1994) study in 
aiming to analyse the progressive formalisation of MAS in a Chinese company 
changing at both the social and organisational levels.  This study will provide a better 
understanding of the process of MAS change in the context of radically changing 
nations.  However, this study differs from Amat et al. (1994).  DERESA is a Spanish 
company set in a different context of social change than that that has been taking place 
in socialistic China.  In particular, there has been little political change in China over 
the last twenty years whereas there has been major economic change (Chow, 2002).  In 
addition, there are significant differences between the west and the east in the 
socio-cultural context (Farmer and Richman, 1965).  This study is therefore 
exploratory in nature, looking for possible new theoretical dimensions or multiple 
variables in the Chinese setting.  
 
2.5 Summary 
 
The model of dualism, as argued by Amat et al. (1994), can help to provide a better 
understanding of MAS change in radically changing nations; in particular, studies 
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based on this model can conceptualise the process of MAS change into a theoretical 
model, which is a challenging issue in the current management accounting literature.  
The next chapter will describe the research method adopted in this study.  
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Chapter 3: Research focus, research questions and research method 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter firstly describes the research focus and outlines the research questions.  
Secondly, it describes the research method adopted in this study, a qualitative case 
study approach, and illustrates the model (Fleischman et al., 1996) guiding this study 
in the collection of required historical evidence.  Thirdly, it details several specific 
data collection techniques adopted in this study, as recommended by Yin (1984) for 
case studies: on-site interviews and observations, archive and documentation analysis, 
and collection and analysis of relevant public documents.   
 
3.2 Research focus and research questions 
 
This study traces and analyses the process of MAS change in China at both the social 
and the organisational levels over the last more than forty years.  It differs from many 
prior China-related studies that are undertaken based on Hofstede’s (1991, 1993) 
cultural comparison model.  Rather, this study pays attention to the possible influence 
of the nation’s cultural shift on the development of MAS and the subsequent MAS 
change.  It also differs from several other prior China-related studies that take a 
technical perspective, illustrating why and how some western management accounting 
techniques can be applied successfully or problematically in a Chinese setting (Lee, 
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2001; Lin and Yu, 2002).  This study is not going to discuss the issue of applicability 
or implementability of western techniques in contemporary China.  Rather, using the 
notion of dualism, this study concentrates on analysing the process of MAS change 
over time in which “environmental dynamics and organisational dynamics 
cross-fertilise each other” (Amat, et al., 1994, p.107). 
 
As this study is an extension of Amat et al.’s (1994) study to another national setting, 
the basic question of the study is, “What contextual aspects have brought about the 
existence of or change in MAS in a Chinese setting over the last more than forty years?”   
 
In addition, this study seeks to answer the following specific questions: 
  
1. What organisational changes has the Chinese company experienced over the 
last more than forty years? How did the changes take place and why? 
 
2. What forms did the MAS take during each period of organisational change, and 
why? 
 
3. What was the interrelationship between the social change process in China and 
the MAS change as a result of organisational change, and why? 
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4. What outer and inner factors found in this Chinese setting are similar to or 
different from the case of DERESA, and why? 
 
3.3 Research methods 
 
Amat et al. (1994, p.107) noted Gray and Roberts’ (1991) argument that “MAS only 
have meaning in relation to the specific historical events relating to each country and to 
each organisation”.  Similarly, Scapens and Roberts (1993) argued that the causes of 
the process of MAS change over time most likely resulted from various historical 
contingencies taking place within and outside the organisation.  It is therefore an 
important methodological concern for this study to seek relevant historical evidence 
from within and outside the case study company with regard to the MAS change over 
time.  
 
Fleischman et al. (1996) presented a useful table (see Table 3.1) of the sources of 
communicative evidences for accounting histories.  This study used many of these 
sources. 
 
Table 3.1  Sources of communicative evidence 
Written           Oral 
Chronicles, annals, biographies, genealogies  Ballads, anecdotes, tapes, sagas 
Memories, diaries, letters, newspapers    Recordings (tapes, disks) 
Literature, public documents, business records 
Inscriptions 
Source: Adapted from Fleischman et al., 1996, p.61 
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Since this study uses a case study approach, seeking in-depth analysis of the MAS 
change process over time at the Chinese setting, the specific data collection techniques 
adopted in this study are those recommended by Yin (1984) for case studies: on-site 
interviews and observations, archive and documentation analysis, and collection and 
analysis of relevant public documents.   
 
During June-July, 2005, the author conducted a one-month intensive on-site study at 
the case study company with the consent of the Company’s current senior managers: 
the sales general manager, the senior accounting consultant (formerly the chief 
accountant) and the secretary of the board of directors:  Four individual interviews 
were held between the author and the current senior managers.  The author also 
conducted four individual interviews with former senior managers of the Company: 
the former general manager, the former vice-general manager, the former secretary of 
the Company’s communist party committee and the former head of a subsidiary of the 
Company.  In addition, one external senior official who currently works for the city 
council was also interviewed individually.  All of the aforementioned interviews 
took place one-on-one and lasted about 2-3 hours each.  Other interviews were 
conducted between the author and a group of selected accounting staff who have 
worked at the Company for more than 15 years.  The group interviews lasted for 
30-45 minutes each.  All of the interview questions with respect to different 
interviewees were prepared by the author before the visits under the approval of the 
author’s supervisor at the University of Canterbury and all of the interviewees’ quotes 
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were taped and relevant parts were subsequently translated into English transcripts.  
 
During the visits, many relevant documents of the Company were collected by the 
author with the senior managers’ consent.  The documentation covered the 
Company’s business history, internal documentation of established accounting rules, 
procedures, practices (both the past and the present ones) and the diagrammatical 
forms of MAS over the different periods, and the periodical financial reports 
published in newspapers and on the stock exchange website.  The author also 
reviewed archives of the Company’s sales, importing and exporting, pension systems, 
production and respective accounting records.  In addition, the author physically 
observed the current accounting staff’s working procedures in the context of the 
present MAS. 
 
The specific historical events at the social level relating to the Company’s 
organisational change and MAS change were collected by the author from a wide range 
of data sources, mainly from relevant prior studies and public documents on 
newspapers or the website.  
 
3.4 Summary 
 
This study, using the model of dualism, concentrates on analysing the process of MAS 
change over time in which “environmental dynamics and organisational dynamics 
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cross-fertilise each other” (Amat, et al., 1994, p.107).  It seeks to answer the basic 
question “What contextual aspects have brought about the existence of or change in 
MAS in a Chinese setting over the last more than forty years?”  Therefore, the research 
method adopted in this study serves to accomplish a qualitative case study.   
 
Several research techniques in collecting required research evidence were used in 
accordance with Yin’s (1984) recommendation.  The next chapter will briefly review 
China’s economic reform and the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises followed 
by a description of the history of the company studied.  
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Chapter 4: Background of China’s economic reform, the reform of 
Stated-Owned Enterprises and the Chinese setting 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will briefly review China’s economic reform undertaken over the last 
more than twenty years.  Also, the reform of state-owned enterprises will be 
discussed by reviewing the research findings of Huang et al. (1998).  The last section 
will describe the history of the company studied, showing the basic organisational 
changes that have been experienced by the company over the last more than forty 
years.  
 
4.2 Overview of China’s economic reform 
 
Unlike many other transition economies, in particular those of Eastern European 
countries, the economic reform in China was launched somewhat earlier (since 1978) 
with a unique reform approach of gradualism1 (Huang et al., 1998; Chow, 2002).  As 
a result of the reform, the national gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 
US$89 billion in 1980 (People’s Daily, 1991) to US$1.65 trillion in 2004 (People’s 
Daily, 2005).  Over the past decade, China's annual GDP growth has averaged a 
remarkable 9 per cent.  Even during the Asian financial crisis, China posted 8.8 per 
                                                        
1 A gradual reform approach (a “wait and see” method) through various experimentations. 
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cent and 7.8 per cent growth in 1997 and 1998 respectively.  In 2001, China 
remained one of the best performing economies in the Asia Pacific region (Chow, 
2002).   
 
China has also been enjoying a favourable trend in foreign investment utilisation since 
its opening up in 1978.  A recent report published on the web2 shows that nearly 450 
out of the world Top 500 transnational companies have invested in China, more than 
30 percent of them having set up regional headquarters. 
 
Many studies have categorised China’s ongoing reform into four phases (see, e.g. Lin 
et al., 1993; Rawski, 1999).  It began with predominantly central planning and 
subordinate markets in the first phase (1979-84), a combination of economic planning 
and market regulation in the second phase (1985-88), governmental regulation of the 
market and market-orientated enterprises in the third (1988-91), and finally a 
dominant socialist market economy since 1997.  
 
4.3 The reform of State-Owned Enterprises 
 
In China’s ongoing economic liberalisation, the reform of State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) has been a central issue since the beginning.  Although the share of SOEs in 
national gross industrial output fell from 85.4% in 1978 (Huang et al., 1998) to less 
                                                        
2 http://strategis.ic.gc.ca
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than 30% in 1996 (Chow, 2002), SOE reform is still a policy priority in China.  
Huang et al. (1998) presented a generalised sketch of the process of change in the 
underlying policies and measures regarding SOE reforms in China over the last 
twenty years (see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1  SOE reforms in China: development of policies and thinking 
 Key measurements Policy debate 
Pre-reform State ownership and central 
planning 
No incentives and low efficiency 
1978— 
Mid–1980s   
Profit-retention and management 
decentralisation 
Granting autonomy and sharing 
benefits 
Mid–1980s— 
1990s     
Contract system and share- 
holding 
Proposals for linking respons- 
ibility, autonomy and benefits 
Early 1990s Emphasising the big and 
liberalising the small 
Autonomy, property rights and 
modern enterprises 
Ongoing 
reforms 
Privatisation, divesture and 
transformation of management 
mechanisms.  
Internal corporate governance 
and competitive environment  
Source: Adapted from Huang et al., 1998, p.3 
 
Stage 1: 1978 — mid-1980s 
According to Huang et al. (1998) and Chow (2002), the principal concerns of SOE 
reform in this stage were extending autonomous rights to SOEs.  First, the 
government strengthened responsibilities of managers and workers in SOEs, and 
gradually replaced investment and capital subsidies to SOEs by loans from banks.  
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Second, the government restored trade in urban and rural areas, and promulgated the 
Foreign Business Law which created a more favourable environment for SOEs. 
 
By the end of 1984, China also replaced the profits being paid to the government by a 
tax system on SOEs which were recognised as independent profit-seeking economic 
entities. 
 
Stage 2: Mid-1980s — 1990 
A contract responsibility system was widely implemented in 1987 (Xu and Li, 1996) 
whereby SOEs could keep their profits after fixed taxes.  In the meantime, market 
pricing was gradually approved except for scarce resources, which were allocated 
through market pricing broadly. 
 
Stage 3: The early 1990s 
The principal changes in the early 1990s, noted Huang et al. (1998), included granting 
SOEs more autonomous rights through clarifying ownership and use rights, reducing 
SOEs’ social burdens, establishing a social insurance system, and solving problems of 
labour redundancies in SOEs through unemployment subsidies, retraining, and 
self-created jobs.  Furthermore, the policies of changing the SOEs into a modern 
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enterprise structure were initiated in this period, resulting in a massive shareholding 
process undertaken in the whole state sector.   
 
Stage 4: Ongoing reform  
The divestiture options, by fully and widely transferring ownership rights to private 
parties, have been gradually implemented among SOEs since 2001. This is in 
accordance with Huang et al.’s (1998) prediction that the privatisation of SOEs might 
be the key measure in China’s ongoing reforms after the 1990s.  Many of the 
unprofitable SOEs have been sold to private investors on the stock exchange market 
through public offerings (Chen, 2004) 
 
4.4 Background of the company  
 
Shanghai Light Industry Machinery Stock Company Limited (SLIMSC), formerly 
Shanghai Light Industry Machinery Company (SLIMC), was founded in 1956 as one 
of the first-class SOEs3 that dealt with the manufacture and research in light industry 
machinery earliest in China.  The Company was established to produce a wide range 
of light industry machinery such as machinery to make plastic, rubber, beverage and 
food, daily chemical, pharmacy, printing, paperboard and packaging products.  
 
                                                        
3 The first-class SOEs in China were mainly controlled directly by the state. 
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SLIMSC has experienced three stages of organisational change owing to the rapid 
socio-economical change taking place in China over the last more than forty years: 
firstly it began as a big SOE, then it was a state-controlled listed company, and finally it 
has become a privately-owned business firm.  The major drive forcing the 
organisational change is the result of governmental decisions.  The former general 
manager (GM) stated: “It is incredible that the Company was such a lucky participant 
involving in every big move undertaken by the central government since the reform was 
carrying on in 1978. Firstly, we were selected as one of two experimental enterprises in 
Shanghai to implement the new tax system in 1982; secondly, the Company went public 
in 1991 as one of the fourteen earliest listed firms in China; and again in 2001, the 
Company was selected to participate in the experiment of privatising the 
state-controlled SOEs among the earliest groups in China.”4  However, the size of the 
Company and its range of productions are shrinking as a result of the organisational 
changes over time (see Table 4.2).  
                                                        
4 All quotes in italics are from interviews and are translated from Chinese by the author. 
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Table 4.2  SLIMSC and its corporate size during 1956-2004 
 
Year Subsidiaries Product Lines Total number 
   of employees 
1956-1981 42 421 18,000 
1982-1991 21 231 6,432 
1992-2001 16 128 3,143 
2002-2004 3 17 1,125 
 
Source: Adapted from the Company’s document 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
Since China’s economic reform began, the reform of SOEs has been the central issue 
in society.  SLIMSC, as a big SOE, has experienced vast organisational change over 
the last more than forty years, including business growth in the 1980s and decline in 
its business scale, starting from the 1990s.  The next chapter presents the process of 
MAS change at both its social and organisational levels in SLIMSC.  
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Chapter 5: The findings 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter illustrates the process of MAS change in SLIMSC during 1956-2004. 
Following the model of dualism discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter classifies the 
MAS change in SLIMSC into four stages (see Figure 5.1), by linking the respective 
changes at both the social and organisational levels in each period with concurrent 
MAS change. 
 
Figure 5.1  Social and organisational contexts and MAS’ developments in  
SLIMSC 
Stages    1956   1978  1991  2002 2004 
     Pre-reform   Early reform Modernisation Privatisation 
Social context 
Organisational context 
MAS’ developments 
 
5.2 Pre-reform: the early years of SLIMSC and the MAS (1956-1978) 
 
At the social level: a socialist planned economy  
 
Since the communist party took over China in 1949, the whole nation’s economy was 
run under a planned economic model similar to that of the Former Soviet Union 
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(FSU).  Due to the central government deciding the whole substance of the economy 
on a daily basis, there was no certain market for trade as well as little idea of 
economic benefits to be gained by individuals within the society.  Furthermore, the 
central government decided all of the economic activities and business practices in the 
state-sector, including production decisions, corporate finance, employment and 
wages, and material allocations.  After the socialist transformation, which was 
completed in 1956, the SOEs accounted for almost 99% of total industrial outputs 
(Huang et al., 1998).  
 
At the organisational level: a workshop rather than an independent enterprise 
 
As one of the first class entities manufacturing light industry machinery under 
Shanghai No.1 Electrical and Machinery Bureau (SEMB)5, the compulsory goal of 
the Company was to accomplish a production plan set directly by the Ministry of 
Commerce and monitored by the SEMB every year.  There were normally three 
sections covered in the plan: output targets, schedules of input allocations, and further 
governmental grants to the Company during the year, such as investment in research 
and development (R&D), production subsidies and investment in infrastructure and 
new production machinery.  The sub-categories in each section normally covered 
items such as details of production, sources of raw materials, levels of employment, 
grades of wages and settlements of new finance.  The Company’s entire annual 
surplus was collected by the local government through the SEMB at each year end. 
                                                        
5 The Bureau has now been restructured into a group company and listed in both Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock 
Exchanges. 
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The Company’s structure was functional and represented the typical communist 
characteristics of many other SOEs in China during the time (see Figure 5.2) 
 
Figure 5.2  The Company’s structure from 1956 to 1978              
 
Communist Party Committee Labour Union 
GM, Chief Economist & Chief Accountant 
Sales & Outsourcing Accounting & Finance Human resources Production & Technology 
The 42 subsidiaries 
Sales & Outsourcing Accounting & Finance Human resources Production & Technology 
Source: Adapted from the Company’s document  
 
The communist party committee, sitting at the top of the Company, held superior 
power to control and monitor the whole organisation.  The paramount duty of the 
committee members was enforcing the political attitude and the socialistic ideology of 
every staff member to be in accordance with political instructions of the state.  
Another major task was monitoring the political performance of individual staff on a 
daily basis.  For a certain time, the committee members could appear in any corner 
of the Company and interfere in the normal course of the business when the members 
considered it necessary.  During this period, the goal, the interest and the subsequent 
actions taken by the committee were not in line with the Company’s development 
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economically but rather politically.  One interviewee commented: “The party 
committee was a government agent who represented solely the government interest. 
When the government placed more emphasis on political issues before the reform, 
unsurprisingly the party committee would actively respond to the call.” 
 
The labour union of the Company also sat at the top and worked as a coordinator of 
the party committee.  The existence of the union and its superior position was in 
conjunction with Marxism’s spirit, taught to all individuals in China during the period, 
of uniting the poor and the exploited worker class in capitalist societies to become 
masters in socialist societies.  However, the majority of the union members, who 
were front line workers, were not able to understand exactly how to become a master 
of the organisation, and, according to some interviewees, eventually they became the 
assistants of the communist party committee.  In addition, the union was responsible 
for holding formal staff ceremonies in the Company.  These ceremonies were 
certainly financially irrelevant but celebrations of political achievement.  
 
The Company’s senior managers were appointed by the SEMB and responsible for 
leading the Company to accomplish the production plan on the one hand, and 
reporting possible production targets in the coming year on the other.  Since most of 
the SOEs in pre-reform China were more like workshops of the state instead of 
independent enterprises, the senior managers could be considered as only a group of 
foremen.  In particular, the wages and bonuses were fixed for every individual in the 
Company including the senior managers.  The efforts contributed by the senior 
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management were, however, extremely strong.  One senior manager who has been 
working for 40 years at the company noted, “Our soul was so-called pure and 
monetarily irrelevant and our contributions were evaluated on a collective-interest 
base. It was amazing that it did work on us. Although we earned little money, we 
didn’t feel any problem because the others within society came with the same 
situation.”  In addition, the senior managers would normally be required to 
participate in the meetings held by the communist party committee when further new 
political instructions came from the central government.  
 
Under the senior management team, there were four functional departments: Sales and 
Outsourcing, Accounting and Finance, Human Resources, and Production and 
Technology.  Since the government had treated the Company as one of its 
workshops, the significance of the roles of the four departments was minor.  The 
sales GM described the situation: “Sales and marketing was just a symbolic term at 
the time since we didn’t need to find ways of selling our products to others. Also, the 
human resources department was in a similar situation as the SEMB made the 
employment arrangements for the Company. Probably only the production 
department was doing some real jobs; however they were not concerned with issues 
like efficiency or quality as we are concerned with them today.”   
 
At the lower levels of the Company, there were 42 factories dealing with the massive 
production of various types of light industry machinery.  Each factory had four 
sub-functional departments as the parent company did.  The fundamental role of the 
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subsidiaries was to manufacture as the parent company required.  The production 
status of each period within a year would be reported in detail through each 
department independently to the related department at the parent company.  Then the 
heads of the subsidiaries would normally prepare a yearly report on the factory’s 
performance in all areas at the year end.  However, a large number of the work force 
in the subsidiaries were at a low educational level and not well trained.  One factory 
head stated, “Before the 1980s, there were only two staff who had obtained a 
university degree at the factory where there were more than 1500 staff in total.  
Under the traditional planning system, the government promised us an Iron Rice 
Bowl (secured employment) and we took the Big Rice Pot (equalised personal 
income). Therefore, we paid less attention to individual professional achievement. 
That certainly resulted in a low level of productivity and efficiency among the 
factories.”  Moreover, during the period of the Cultural Revolution6 [1966-1976], 
many young revolutionists, who were mainly members of the union, suspended the 
normal course of production of the factories, and even occupied the Company’s 
communist party committee.  
 
The Company’s MAS during the pre-reform time: little emphasis on MAS practice 
 
Since the government brought all SOEs under central control, it is not surprising that 
the Company’s accounting system was developed to fulfil an administrative role in 
conjunction with the tight control.  Accountancy principles and practices were 
                                                        
6 In 1966, Chairman Mao (1893-1976) launched the Cultural Revolution in China. The whole nation was involved 
in political chaos and the economy was severely damaged during these ten years. 
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determined by the Ministry of Finance, which established a unified accounting system 
at the Company.  This system set up the chart of accounts with a cash-fund-based 
form of debit/credit double-entry bookkeeping system with two categories: fund 
applications and fund sources.  The fund application accounts belonged to the 
general asset account while the fund source accounts might be comparable to the 
concepts of liabilities and equity in the west.  In addition, the system did not analyse 
profit and loss of the business.  “At this stage, there was no notion of profit at the 
Company and the accounting system focused on the quantities of outputs in 
accordance to governmental budgets,” one accounting interviewee commented.  
 
Furthermore, there was little emphasis on management accounting practices and the 
major accounting activities were merely to record transactions.  The former chief 
accountant commented: “In this period, our major tasks for accounting were 
bookkeeping. However, periodic reports on costs of production were also considered 
important except for the time of the Great Leap Forward7 [1958-1962] and the 
Cultural Revolution. The procedure for cost analysis was through a form of clarifying 
the unit costs of comparable products or non-comparable products. This process was 
simple but time-consuming, like a process of data collection of various inputs’ prices. 
Firstly, the accounting staff at the subsidiaries would record all relevant costs 
incurred after each production task was accomplished and put them into a report 
form then send it to the parent company’s accounting department. We would receive 
                                                        
7 In 1958, Chairman Mao launched the Great Leap Forward in an attempt to boost significantly the industrial 
outputs by maximising the abundant unproductive labour resources. However, the result of this campaign was  
the ruination of the nation’s economy and social orders since this campaign was hostile towards the development 
of technologies and education, and subsequently suspended most of the administrative, professional and 
educational facilities in China (Lawrence, 1997) 
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hundreds of the reports during each month and be required to generalise them into 
the final report at the end of each month then send it to the SEMB’s accounting 
department. The purpose of the reports was to help the central government make 
price decisions for industrial goods at the year end.”  
 
5.3 In the early years of the reform: SLIMSC and the MAS (1978-1991) 
 
At the social level: restoring the command system in the shortage economy 
 
In 1978, an open-door policy was launched as a result of the Third Session of the 11th 
Plenary of the Chinese Communist Party (Lin et al., 1997) and reform with a 
gradualist approach was implemented under the influence of Mr. Deng Xiao Ping8.  
 
As a response to the early reform, the recovery of China’s administrative, financial 
and professional institutions back to the former command system was carried out at a 
quick pace.  The Accounting Society of China, the first and only academic 
accountancy institute in China at the time, was reorganised in 1980 (Zhou, 1988). 
Furthermore, those purged “elitists” during the Cultural Revolution were released 
back to their earlier working positions.  
 
During the period, the reform of the SOEs had been agreed as the first priority within 
all levels of the central party, and consequently a set of policies of granting more 
                                                        
8 Deng Xiao Ping (1904-1997), the former president of China, was the earliest leader who launched the reform. 
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autonomy to SOEs was approved.  Simultaneously, the government promoted a 
gradual liberalisation of the non-state sector and subsequently a fresh and vigorous 
sector emerged in the nation’s economy. 
 
However, since China had experienced two periods of civil chaos, the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, “the nation’s economy was close to the edge of 
collapse and the recovery took a certain amount of time”.  As one interviewee9 
commented, “We had experienced the scarcity of both consumer and industrial goods 
for almost 30 years since the 1960s.  This situation was not improved until the early 
1990s.”   In addition, the interviewee noted that there were many constraints during 
the early period of the reform: “There was political scepticism about the reform and 
the local protectionism among the major industries setting barriers to the process of 
formulating a market to promote competition.” 
 
The first accounting law of China was established and implemented in 1985 as a 
result of the Ninth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People’s 
Congress (Zhou, 1988).  Under this new law, the functions, responsibilities, legal 
rights and legal liabilities of the Chinese accounting officers and staff were 
promulgated in a legal form (Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
1985).  This law required all of the Chinese enterprises to work in a unified 
accounting system similar to the form mentioned earlier but with several amendments 
(to be detailed in the next section).  The first professional accountancy body in China, 
                                                        
9 This interviewee is currently the head of the economic development team in the city council. 
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the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA), was established and 
regulated by the State Council10 in 1986 (Lawrence, 1997).  
 
At the organisational level: obtaining some autonomy, retaining a part of profit and 
enjoying monopoly power 
 
The granting of more autonomy to the SOEs resulted in three new policies being 
implemented at the Company in this period.  They were “the introduction of a new 
tax system, the implementation of a management responsibility contract system and 
the change of the traditional government granting budget to the repayable bank loan 
system”, one senior manager noted.  In addition, the Company’s accounting system 
was revised in 1981 in accordance with the criteria stipulated by the Ministry of 
Finance; there were several other amendments introduced into the system under the 
1985 Accounting Law. 
 
The new tax system  
At the end of 1981, the Company was selected as one of two SOEs in Shanghai to 
participate in the experiment of facilitating a new tax system entitled “the 1st Profit 
Delivery to Tax Payment” (See Figure 5.3).  The former chief accountant noted that, 
“under this tax system, we would no longer submit the entire surplus at the year end 
but instead, we paid a fixed 55% income tax rate to the government. We were also 
required to pay the other three taxes including Sales tax, Capital Rent tax and 
                                                        
10 The State Council is the legislative body existing between the Ministries and the People's Congress in 
China. 
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Adjustment tax. For the sales tax, it was substituted by Value-Added tax (17%) later, 
similar to GST in the west. For the capital rent tax, it covered the real estate taxes, 
the vehicle tax and the land-in-use tax. For the adjustment tax, it firstly adjusted the 
total amount of the income tax we paid at the year end to reach the same level as the 
total surplus we submitted in the last year. This part of the tax payment was entitled 
the floor quota of tax payment. As a result, we retained a portion of the profit at the 
end of 1982. The retained profit might increase if the total realised profit increased in 
the coming year and the state would also charge the additional income tax and 
adjustment tax. This part of the tax payment was entitled the above-quota of tax 
payment. As a highly profitable company in the period, we were granted 70% off in 
the adjustment tax levied on the continuous increment in the total realised profits 
from 1982-1990.” 
 
Figure 5.3  The new tax system 
 
 
55% 
 
     Income tax payment 
     Adjustment tax payment 
R&D, Funds 
? The floor 
quota of 
tax 
payment       45% 
Retained 
profit Rewards & Bonus 
      55% Income tax payment 
Adjustment tax payment (70% off) 
R&D, Funds 
 
Total realised 
income after 
sales tax and 
capital rent 
taxes 
? The above 
quota of 
tax 
payment 
  
      45% Retained 
profit Rewards & Bonus 
 
Source: Adapted from the Company’s document 
 
In 1983, the second Profit Delivery to Tax Payment program was widely adopted 
among China’s SOEs, including the Company, the only difference being “the income 
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tax rate becoming 50%”.  The former chief accountant stated, “The financial 
significance as a result of the tax system was so impressive that we had retained 
profits amounted to RMB 20 million (about 4 million USD at the time) during 
1982-1990.”. 
 
The management responsibility contract system 
Right after the adoption of the second Profit Delivery to Tax Payment program, the 
Company was further required by the SEMB to establish a management responsibility 
contract system in 1984.  Under this system, the SEMB signed a contract with the 
Company’s GM who was going to be held responsible for the Company’s total profits 
and losses, and, in the meantime, the GM was granted a partial control right to run the 
business. 
 
According to one interviewee, the partial control right included “recruiting new 
managerial staff and promoting the old well-performed staff, and determining the 
level of wages and bonus for subordinates, and most of all deciding how to re-invest 
the retained profits into new profitable projects for the Company’s long term 
development.”  Thus, the Company became more like an independent business entity 
than its former administrative form.  However, the state still held the power of the 
last-say, in particular in recruiting senior management and determining their regular 
salaries. 
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Under this system, the heads of the subsidiaries were responsible for accomplishing 
the required workload determined by the parent company.  At each year end, the 
performance of the subsidiaries was measured on the basis of the percentage of each 
assigned responsibility the individual factory had accomplished. 
 
The repayable bank loan system 
In 1982, another new program called the repayable bank loan system was introduced 
into the Company.  Under this system, all investment from the state to the Company, 
combined with incurred interest expenses, became repayable on a legitimatised base. 
“The certain pressure from this new system however became exposed by the middle of 
the 1990s when the Company was struggling for the profits for survival”, noted one 
accounting interviewee. 
 
The revised unified accounting system at the Company 
Comparing with the old financial accounting system before the 1980s, the former 
chief accountant noted that the new accounting system forced the Company to 
improve accounting measures and tighten the control of cost of products.  In line 
with the requirements, several new fund accounts were introduced and established to 
distribute the retained profits at the Company.  The system also required the 
Company to prepare an annual income statement and a statement of profit distribution 
at the year end.  In addition, new three-digit code numbers relating to the different 
categories of accounts were introduced into the accounting system. 
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Furthermore, half of the Company’s subsidiaries, manufacturing paper board and 
packaging machinery and printing machinery, were separated from the parent 
company.  This was the idea of Mr. Zhao Ziyang11 who argued that “SOEs should 
become more specialised in production and independent in decision-making”.  The 
former GM stated, “Our product lines thus became more focused on manufacturing 
chemical (plastic, rubber, etc), foodstuffs and pharmacy machinery.” 
 
Responding to the implementation of the new systems, a restructuring program was 
undertaken at the Company in 1984.  The organisational structure was re-constituted 
as follows (see Figure 5.4):  
 
Figure 5.4  The Company’s structure during the 1980s 
Communist Party Committee General Manager 
Sales & Outsourcing Accounting & Finance Human resources Production & 
Technology 
The 21 subsidiaries 
Sales & Outsourcing Accounting & Finance Human resources Production & Technology 
Labour 
Union 
Vice GMs & Chief Engineer 
Chief Accountant 
 
Source: Adapted from the Company’s document 
 
                                                        
11 Zhao Ziyang (1918-2004), the former prime minister of China  
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The communist party committee still sat at the top since it represented the central 
party who held the last-say on the Company’s business operation.  However, there 
was a fundamental change in the function of the party committee in the business.  
The former party secretary stated, “Our key duty was to coordinate the Company’s 
senior management to fulfil their responsibilities for the quota profit and achieve 
more financial income so more tax income could be received by the state. It was also 
our duty to keep the country’s capital assets safe at the Company.”   Meanwhile, 
political concerns were still regarded as the major issue by the committee in this 
period, according to the other interviewees.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this section, the GM’s managerial autonomy was further 
extended due to the new systems being implemented at the Company.  Since the GM 
was the key contractor who held the fundamental responsibility for submitting the 
quota profit to the state in each year, inevitably the GM became the top leader with 
more political and economic power at the Company.  According to one interviewee, 
the subsequent formulation of the senior management team including the two 
vice-GMs – Sales and Production (the production GM was also the chief engineer), 
and the chief accountant was recommended by the GM and appointed by the SEMB.  
The interviewee also commented that the role of the senior management team had 
been more “recognisable and decidable” at the company since then.  Furthermore, 
according to many of the interviewees, this senior management team, that was striving 
to fulfil their responsibilities, had successfully led the Company to submit the quota 
profit of each year during the period.  However, the goals for the Company’s success 
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held by the senior management team were partly inspired by the corresponding 
increase in the personal bonuses and partly due to “their being a group of people who 
held strongly the conventional socialistic ideology concerning the glory and loyalty to 
the collective interest and the party.”  Some of the interviewees further commented, 
“Money is good but was not that good to many Chinese people in the early 1980s. 
Many things taught to us could be better than money. The senior management team as 
well as many individuals at the company thought more about their contributions to 
the country and less about themselves. This could be a good example against the later 
condition.” 
 
At the sub-functional departments’ level, there was an increasingly significant role 
being played by each department.  For the sales department, although the majority of 
the selling contracts were still arranged by the “Ministry of Commerce”, the sales GM 
stated, “we became more motivated in finding new profitable contracts which would 
bring us more personal income.”  Furthermore, the period from 1981 to 1990 is 
viewed as the most amazing ten years by many of the interviewees.  The sales GM 
noted, “Due to the nation’s shortage economy in particular in the 1980s, the demand 
for our products highly exceeded the supply. That consequently made us reach the 
highest levels of yearly sales and profits achievement in the Company’s history. For a 
certain time during the period, our salesmen were treated as VIPs by external buyers 
on a daily basis since many of them, especially those who were from the emerging 
private sector, were unable to acquire the types of machinery elsewhere. This 
situation also applied to our certain capabilities of obtaining other scarce raw 
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materials with an internal cheaper price; we then simply put a high margin on them 
and sold them quite easily. However, the sources of many unhealthy tendencies 
among us were also emerging, such as accepting others’ gifts, enjoying free meals, 
etc.”  Meanwhile, some staff who had been previously punished for bad behaviour 
stated that the extremely low salary and hardly reaching a bonus had resulted in their 
convictions, according to one interviewee.  On this aspect, one accounting 
interviewee added, “The Company’s average monthly wage was around RMB 120 
(approximately USD 15 per month) and the reward and bonus system linked a fairly 
small amount of money to individual performance during this period. Besides, a large 
percentage of the Company’s sales income was made through the state arrangements 
in the 1980s.” 
 
For the human resource department, there came a new emphasis on increasing the 
level of education at the Company in the mid-1980s.  One former senior manager 
stated, “Prime Minister Zhao once pointed out that the level of technologies among 
China’s SOEs is markedly low and the level of managerial know-how is even lower. 
Thus, in 1986, the human resource staff were required to resolve this low educational 
problem at the Company. It began in two ways: firstly, many of the managers in the 
middle or higher level were encouraged to take part or full-time college programs 
and the Company was responsible for the total fees; meanwhile, some young well- 
performing staff were also selected to join with the managers. Secondly, the human 
resource department signed many contracts with the local educational bureau to 
recruit numbers of new university graduates in each year.”  Since then, the human 
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resource department has been more independent in recruiting new staff for the 
Company.  
 
The production and technology department, headed by the vice-GM, became the most 
influential unit of the Company.  Before the reform, this department emphasised 
solely the production quota set by the state.  During the early period of the reform, 
producing higher quantities of outputs was becoming the most critical target of the 
department due to larger demand externally.  Since the Company had no right to 
develop new factories in the 1980s (the state held this right), the only way to resolve 
the unsatisfied productivity problem was to increase the technological level of 
production.  Therefore, many new production-oriented programs were undertaken 
through the department including, for instance, purchasing or leasing new 
technological patents from overseas, hiring new engineers or technical consultants 
and developing new methods of production.  However, some interviewees pointed 
out that the long-term benefit of the new programs was not satisfactory and one of 
them stated, “The fundamental issue was we still focused on quantity but not quality 
since we didn’t have the pressure to be concerned about quality in the 1980s under a 
protected and shortage economy. Therefore, the majority of the programs invested in 
through the department became absolutely worthless when competitive pressures were 
emerging in the early 1990s.” 
 
The accounting and finance department, headed by the chief accountant, began to play 
a significant role in improving the Company’s financial performance and enhancing 
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the Company’s level of economic management.  This could have been related to 
many of the financial accounting procedures and practices becoming more formal and 
comparable under the adoption of the new accounting law of 1985, and also to many 
new management accounting practices being introduced through the department to the 
Company (detailed in the next category).  
  
Another change in the Company’s structure was that the labour union became one of 
the functional departments responsible for the Company’s periodic ceremonies.  
However, the contents of those ceremonies were changed to rewarding the good and 
penalising the bad on the basis of financial measures. 
 
The Company’s MAS during the early years of the reform: formalised MAS with some 
western management accounting concepts and methods 
 
With the arrival of socio-economic changes at both the social and organisational 
levels, there was a significant expansion in the Company’s managerial need for 
accounting information.  Since many new issues, such as profitability and cost 
saving, were emerging during the period when China’s open door policy was carried 
out and the new programs were further implemented in the Company, some western 
management accounting concepts and methods were gradually introduced into the 
Company’s accounting system.  The former chief accountant stated, “We learned 
through books and magazines, from the accounting colleges where we participated in 
the part-time or full-time programs, through training materials we obtained from the 
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state accountancy association. Many new western management accounting practices 
were considered as a vital tool in coping with the Company’s increasing managerial 
needs for economic development. Therefore, a new financial management system 
combining both western and Chinese characteristics was further established at the 
Company.” 
 
The purpose of this financial management system, according to the former chief 
accountant, was to help the Company to obey the state financial law, to assist in 
accomplishing the duty of the quota profit, to explore the enterprise potential 
capabilities, to improve the level of production and technology, to reduce cost and to 
enhance the level of economic performance.  Under this system, a formal process of 
forecasting, planning, controlling, analysing and evaluating was undertaken (see 
Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure 5.5  The Company’s financial management system during the 1980s 
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Source: Adapted from the Company’s document 
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The process was normally started in the third quarter of each financial year by 
preparing the next year’s financial plan.  There were three stages in finalising the 
plan: preparation, adjustment and confirmation (see Figure 5.6).  
 
Figure 5.6  The stages of setting up the financial plan 
Preparation Data collection  
Setting targets 
Drafting the plans at the subsidiaries’ level 
Drafting the plan at the Company’s level 
Approval by the state 
Implementation of the financial plan  
Adjustment 
Confirmation 
Source: Adapted from the Company’s document 
 
There were four sub-plans in the yearly financial plan: the profit plan, the cost plan, 
the investment plan, and the fund plan. 
 
(1) The profit plan  
 
The profit plan consisted of short-term (less than one year), middle-term (between one 
year and five years) and long-term (longer than five year) plans.  According to the 
former chief accountant, the paramount purpose of the plan was to fulfil the quota 
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profit responsibilities held by the Company to the state.  Meanwhile, as the 
Company became capable of sharing the aforementioned profit portion at the year end, 
it was also necessary to implement the profit control strategy through the profit plan 
system.  
 
The form of the profit plan was as follow (see Figure 5.7),  
 
Figure 5.7  The profit plan during the 1980s 
 
                   Profit Plan 
                     19**             Amount total: 0,000 Yuan 
Rows No.     Details of Subjects  Last year 
Next year 
(Projected) 
1 Beginning finished goods inventory 
2 Costs of goods manufactured 
3 Ending finished goods inventory 
4 Costs of goods sold 
5 Wages and bonus 
6 Administrative, selling and operating expenses 
7 Revenue from main operations 
8 Sales tax 
9 Capital rent taxes 
10 Profit from sales : 7- 4-5-6-8-9 
11 Profit margin: (10/4 *100%) 
12 Other income after sales tax 
13 Total gross profit : 10+12 
14 Income tax stipulated  
15 Adjustment tax 
16 Net profit retained 
    
 
Source: Adapted from the Company’s document 
 
The above profit plan indicates that a full costing method was adopted by the 
Company during the period.  This method took all manufacturing costs (costs of 
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direct materials, direct labour and manufacturing overheads) and all administrative, 
selling and operating expenses into the general cost account.   
 
(2) The cost plan 
 
Four budgets made up the cost plan: (a) budgeted unit cost of main products 
(comparable products and non-comparable products); (b) budgeted reduction in the 
cost of comparable products; (c) budgeted administrative and operating expenses at 
both the Company and the subsidiary levels; and (d) budgeted manufacturing 
overhead costs.  
 
At the year end, the statement of the unit cost of main products as one of the 
Company’s formal financial reports was submitted by the Company to the Ministry of 
Finance.  The SEMB would require the Company to reduce the costs of comparable 
products on average 1-2% in the coming year.  Also, the Company senior 
management would normally compare the cost statement to the cost plan to evaluate 
the Company’s performance at the year end.  
 
(3) The investment plan 
 
This plan was developed on the basis of distributing the Company’s own funds (the 
accumulated retained profits).  As mentioned earlier, most of the plans were 
searching for ways of enhancing the level of productivity during the period.  Many 
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western methods were adopted in the process of formulating the investment plan, for 
example, “cost-volume-profit analysis, marginal analysis, time value of money 
analysis and the payback period method.”  The former chief accountant stated, 
“Obviously, we had adopted more western methods in this planning category as we 
put more concerns on re-investing our own funds which are certainly more 
controllable.”  Nevertheless, the goal of contributing more tax revenue to the 
government was considerably guiding the accounting staff and the managers in 
making the investment decision.  The former chief accountant noted, “Even though 
we had set up several other measures such as return on investment based on a net 
present value method, break-even rate and payback period on analysing undertaken 
investment projects, the key measure driving our investment decision was the tax 
contribution margin,” calculated as follows: 
 
(Annual fixed costs incurred + Annual selling taxes from the new products sold)* 100% 
                  The total amount of the investment 
                    
(4) The fund plan 
 
The establishment of the fund plan, associated with the subsequent fund management, 
was the major task for the accounting and finance department during the period.  
This plan was undertaken by the department under the framework of the unified 
accounting system based on the accounting law in China.  Each year, it was not only 
a legal liability for the Company to distribute and manage those funds legitimately in 
conjunction with the state’s criteria in the accounting law, but also a legal right of the 
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Company to propose a plan requiring additional funds for the onward economic 
development.  According to the former chief accountant, the fund plan provided a 
closer link between the state and the Company.  
 
There were four categories in the fund plan.  They were: (a) the plan for fixed assets 
management and depreciation; (b) the quota current fund (including own current fund) 
plan; (c) the special fund plan; and (d) the monetary fund plan.  The plan for fixed 
assets management and depreciation indicated the legal responsibilities of the 
Company to correctly account for, manage and protect the state’s fixed assets at the 
Company.  The quota current funds (similar to the current asset accounts) plan 
emphasised effectively managing the quick assets, ensuring the continuation of 
business operations in a normal cycle.  The special fund plan related to those 
possible governmental grants for developing the Company’s infrastructure and 
product lines.  The monetary fund plan related to the possible cash management 
programs to be implemented in the coming year.  
 
After the financial plan was approved by the state and implemented by the Company, 
the next process under the financial management system was controlling (see Figure 
5.5). Since the Company had adopted a management responsibility contract system, 
the controlling process was by assigning responsibilities down to various units and 
levels of the Company.  The former chief accountant commented, “Under this 
centrally controlled financial management system, from the process of setting up the 
financial plan to the process of assigning the responsibilities for controlling, the 
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managerial decision was made through a top-down approach as the top management 
team would not be likely to negotiate with the sub-ordinates about the issues 
regarding how many responsibilities they could share, but would keep them informed 
about how many responsibilities they had to share.”  
 
Furthermore, the periodic internal performance reports comparing the actual results 
with the budgets set in the plans would be submitted by the accounting and finance 
department to senior management.  The senior managers would then strive to resolve 
any unfavourable results through formal (monthly, quarterly and semi-annual) or 
informal meetings.  
 
At the year end, at the staff ceremony, the senior managers would reward the 
subordinates according to the performance they had achieved.  However, the amount 
of bonus was normally not linked to individual performance but in accordance with 
the external average industry level, even with some so-called “official comments from 
above.”  The former chief accountant stated, “This was a conventional pattern 
among the Chinese SOEs during the period of the early reform. The financially-based 
compensation system was implemented by the Company as well as the other SOEs on 
an extremely cautious basis.  It had even been treated as explosive news at the 
Company when an average yearly bonus per staff was paid of up to RMB 180 (USD 
30) by one of our well-performing factories in 1988. Therefore, many staff of the 
Company were not actually motivated by the new systems and especially individual 
innovative thinking was not likely to be promoted. They might however stimulate 
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dysfunctional factors, in particular managerial corruption, where people pursued 
financial self-interest. For example, the head of that well-performing factory was 
sentenced to jail in 1992 because of embezzlement he conducted during 1987-1991.”    
 
5.4 In the period of a modernised enterprise: SLIMSC and the MAS (1991-2001) 
 
At the social level: the emergence of a socialist market economy and its competition 
 
With the arrival of the 1990s, under the gradualism slogan, China’s reform was 
stepping into the critical period of the transformation from a planned economy to a 
market economy.  The idea of creating a socialist market economy emerged as a 
result of the 14th Central Communist Party of China’s issuing the Decision on Issues 
Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure in 1993 (Tian, 
1997).  However, the fundamental impetus to forcing the nation-wide economic 
structural change came earlier than the 1993 decision from both the internal and the 
external side of the economy.  
 
In respect to the internal competitive forces, many research studies (see e.g. Lin et al., 
1997; Rawski, 1997; Keidel, 1998) concluded that the sharp rise of the Chinese 
non-state sector in the early 1990s caused an astonishing momentum to the transition 
into a market economy in China.  During the 1990s, it was statistically evident that 
not only was the non-state sector gradually dominating the nation’s total industrial 
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output, but also the continual poor performance of the state sector was beginning to 
demolish the conventional command system (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).  
 
Table 5.1  Industrial Outputs of State-Owned and Non-State Owned 
Enterprises      
 
 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
 
(RMB 100 million) 
 
Gross Industrial 34599  48402  70176  91894  99595 
Output Value 
 
State-owned  17824  22725  26201  31200  28361 
Enterprises    
 
Non-state owned 16775  25677  43975  60694  71234 
Enterprises 
 
-Collective owned 
Enterprises  12135  16464  26472  33623  39232 
--Village            3534   5373   8102  11932  11730 
--Township   3632   5163   9658  11847  15900 
--Cooperative        870   1322   2611   2134   3387 
 
-Individual owned 
Enterprises   2006   3861   7982  11821  15420 
 
-Other type   2688   5174   9018   5231  16582 
 
 
Source: Adapted from China Statistical Yearbook, 1997, p.411 
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Figure 5.8  Percentage share of industrial output by SOEs during 1992-1996 
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Source: Adapted from State Statistical Bureau, 1997, p.411. 
 
 
Table 5.2  Industrial SOEs gross nominal and real losses  
 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Gross nominal losses 
(Billion Yuan)   -35  -37  -37  -45  -48  -64  -79 
 
Gross real losses 
(Billion Yuan)   -35  -35  -33  -32  -29  -33  -40 
 
Source: Adapted from Keidel, 1998, p.81 
 
Another part of the internal force towards a market-oriented economy was the 
incremental implementation of a dual-track price system initiated in the late 1980s.  
The dual price system, like a “semi-product of the reform in the 1980s, became 
institutionalised and functionalised in the 1990s,” commented the interviewee from 
the city council.  Furthermore, Lin et al. (1997, p.50-51) commented, 
 
[In the dual-track price system] both the planning and market price were 
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applied to the same product…The [early] reform in resource allocation and 
price system resulted in [the] dual-track system…the number of industrial 
products directly controlled by the State Planning Committee decreased from 
above 120 to about 60 in the period of 1979-1992; the number of materials 
distributed exclusively by the state dropped from 126 to 26; and the number of 
commodities by the Ministry of Commerce reduced from 188 to 23. The 
proportion of all commodities produced under the planning control and 
exchanged with planning price fell below 30% [in the 1990s]… 
  
The above quotes indicate that under the dual-track price system, the increasing 
numbers of both consumer and industrial goods in China over the reform period were 
no longer controlled and priced by the state but determined by the emerging market 
mechanism.  This also implies that a large number of the Chinese SOEs became 
exposed to the market and market competition.  
 
In respect to the external competitive forces, the major force resulted from a rapid 
increase in the numbers of foreign investors, who strove to be the first and feared to 
lag behind, rushing into China and building up large investments in local industries.  
According to Qiu and Chadee (2001), the total amount of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in China began to increase sharply over a relatively short period in the early 
1990s from an annual average of US$ 2,000 million during 1979-1985 to an average 
of approximately US$ 20,000 million a year over the 1990-1995 periods (see Figure 
5.9).  
Chapter 5: The findings   5-31 
Figure 5.9  Utilised FDI in China: 1979-1996 
 
Source: Adapted from Qiu and Chadee, 2001, p.124. 
 
In addition, the further implementation of the open-door policy focusing on the 
accession of China’s economy to the international market in the 1990s (also regarded 
as the pre-world trade organisation (WTO) reform period) resulted in the nation’s 
“simple average tariff” falling from “42.9% in 1992” to “15.3 % in 2001” (Adhikari 
and Yang, 2002, p.02).  China’s trade liberalisation has brought a large number of 
imports with higher quality and competitive prices through the various foreign agents 
into the market since the early 1990s (Keidel, 1998).  This pattern might also be 
considered as another major external force to driving China’s economic structural 
change starting from the 1990s.  
 
Responding to the SOEs’ average weakened performance and the emerging 
competitive forces, both internal and external, policies seeking to improve further the 
SOEs’ autonomy and efficiency were gradually established by the state. Note that 
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most of the policies over the period were aiming to sustain and protect SOEs’ business 
operations, in particular the big SOEs, and to avoid the big bang approach of the 
Russian reforms (Huang et al., 1998).   
 
Therefore, in the early 1990s, the state initiated an experiment of establishing a 
modern enterprise system at the SOEs by either carefully selecting several profitable 
SOEs to list in the two newly launched stock exchange markets12 through an initial 
public offering (IPO) process, or restructuring the SOEs into limited liability 
corporate structures with a board of directors.  This experimental scheme was further 
approved by the 14th Central Communist Party of China Congress in 1993 and widely 
piloted after the China’s 15th Party Congress in 1997 (Keidel, 1998).  According to 
Keidel (1998), by the end of the 1990s, more than 600 firms were listed, 
approximately 10,000 medium and large SOEs had adopted the modern enterprise 
system and 120 large enterprise groups were designated. 
 
Another significant development in China over the 1990s was updating the old and 
flawed legal system to cope with further reform and open-market issues. According to 
Shi and Weisert (2002), the new laws and regulations that had emerged over the 
period included Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment (1987), the 
Certified Accountant Law (1993), Audit Law (1994), Corporation Law (1994), 
People's Bank of China Law (1995), Commercial Bank Law (1995), Securities Law 
                                                        
12 The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were launched in December 1990 and April 1991 
respectively. 
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(1998), and Accounting Law (1999). The key regulatory bodies involved in the 
lawmaking process are the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the 
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), the Ministry of Finance, and the 
People's Bank of China.  
 
Furthermore, the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, which became 
closer to International Accounting Standards, were approved by the State Council in 
1992 (Lawrence, 1997).  Also, during the period, international accounting and 
business consulting firms were allowed into China, providing management consulting 
advice on setting up accounting systems in both local and foreign firms. 
 
At the organisational level: a modern market-oriented enterprise and decline in 
performance 
 
As a prominent, well-performing SOE in the 1980s, the Company was selected by the 
state as one of the fourteen earliest participants to go public at the end of 1990.  
Based on the 1992 Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and the 1992 Draft 
of Corporation Law regarding Experimental Schemes on Shareholding Issues, in mid- 
1992 the Company was converted into a joint-stock company and listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange.  The registered capital was RMB 210,192,000 
( approximately RMB 6.5 : USD 1.00 at the time), including 73,567,200 state-owned 
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shares accounting for 35% of the total amount, 112,624,800 society-owned legal 
person shares accounting for 53.58% and 24,000,000 social current stocks accounting 
for 11.42%.  Note that 88.58% shares of the Company were concentrated in the 
hands of the government.   
 
Furthermore, the Company’s annual income tax rate became 33% under the new 
accounting standards and laws.  The earlier tax system associated with the 
compulsory submission of the annual quota profit regime was demolished in the 
Company.  However, the Company’s coming year profit targets still required 
approval by the SEMB. 
 
Parallel to the process of going public, the Company’s organisational chart was also 
moving towards the structure of a modern corporation (see Figure 5.10).  However, 
many interviewees pointed out that there was little fundamental change at the 
Company at this stage, one of them commenting, “There was little change in terms of 
function, authority and accountability but only on the Company’s appearance at the 
early stage of the modern enterprise regime. Most importantly, the Company’s 
management system over the early 1990s remained under the conventional command 
system and was not market oriented.” 
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Figure 5.10  The Company’s structure after shareholding process 
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Since 88.58% of the shares were in the hands of the state, the government agencies 
were entitled to be in the shareholders’ congress which sat at the top and held the 
power of last-say at the Company.  However, there was a process of rapid change in 
the realisation of decision-making autonomy at the Company during the 1990s.  
According to one former senior manager, starting from the early 1990s the Company’s 
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managerial decision-making areas were extended to, for example, production 
decisions, product pricing and marketing, raw material purchasing, importing and 
exporting, investment decisions and personnel management.  Except for some 
critical areas, such as strategic business combinations (joint venturing or internal 
business restructuring) and lay-offs, the shareholders’ congress was not going to 
interfere in the Company’s normal decision-making process.  
 
From 1992 to 1994, the chairman of the board of directors was the former GM.  This 
“honest and conventional senior communist party member,” as he was regarded by 
some interviewees, had led the Company to benefit from the last period of the planned 
command system.  These benefits include, noted the interviewees, “the privileges of 
obtaining raw materials based on the official prices, priority in meeting foreign 
investors regarding the issue of joint venturing, the capability of selling products 
through the official channels and the opportunity of investing in new technologies 
with lower rate bank loans.”  After the retirement of the GM, the new chairman of 
the board of directors was from the SEMB and had also worked in another 
governmental office.  During the 1990s, this chairman participated little in the 
formal meetings of the Company and delegated most of the control power to the 
senior managers.  
 
In 1994, based on the 1994 Corporation Law regarding the commission for discipline 
and inspection at listed companies in China, a supervisory committee was established 
at the Company to protect the shareholders’ interests by attempting to join various 
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meetings held by the board of directors.  Since the government was the biggest 
shareholder at the Company, this committee was actually representing the government 
(the principal) to monitor the managers (the agent) in the business operations.  The 
head of the labour union was appointed by the shareholders’ congress as one of the 
three inspectors of the committee.  However, the committee was “simply a form with 
no function”, one interviewee commented.  “They were actually isolated from the 
daily business operations by the senior managers.” 
 
In 1995, a new GM was appointed by the board of directors as a result of a 
governmental arrangement.  It is noted that the GM came into the position at the 
point in time when the Company became fully exposed to the market and was faced 
with dynamic competition.  Many of the conventional privileges mentioned earlier 
were vanishing.  “As one of the generations that grew under the planned economy,” 
the GM stated, “it was hard for us to react quickly to the external rapidly changing 
environment in regard to the Company’s management system. However, we had to find 
ways to deal with the pressures from the emerging competitive environment.” 
 
Many new strategic actions linking short-term and long-term economic improvements 
in the business had been taken by the senior management over the period.  
According to the GM, these actions included (1) efforts on marketing, R&D and 
quality improvement, (2) efforts towards efficient and effective business operations 
associated with the improvements in the accounting system and the incentive 
compensation system, (3) delegation of more autonomy to the subsidiaries, and (4) 
Chapter 5: The findings   5-38 
efforts towards maximising the support from the state.  From 1995, the annual profit 
budgeting process between the state and the Company became a complete bargaining 
process.  Unlike the loyal predecessor, the then GM had kept on bargaining with the 
government agencies to maximise the retained profit share at the Company over the 
period.  
 
Furthermore, the GM paid much more attention to the periodic financial results, 
investment projects and internal or external managerial advice than his predecessor 
had, in particular putting more emphasis on issues of profitability, quality and 
efficiency.  Subsequently, “the GM and the chief accountant became almost 
inseparable in discussing any issues regarding the business operation,” noted one 
accounting interviewee.  “This close relationship was also reflected in their visits to 
the subsidiaries, bargains with the state and even business trips overseas.”  
 
The two vice-GMs and the chief accountant had been newly appointed by the board of 
directors in the early 1990s soon after their predecessors had retired.  
 
Another noteworthy feature in the Company’s new structure was that the secretary of 
the communist party committee became no longer the boss of the Company but only 
held a title of vice-GM.  The new function of the secretary was public relations and 
being in charge of the labour union.  Furthermore, there were increasing disputes 
between the GM and the secretary over the period.  According to one interviewee, 
the disputes started with “the GM paying less attention to discussing the Company’s 
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operating issues with the secretary” and ended up with “the GM with some other 
senior managers ignoring the existence of the secretary at the Company”.  In 
response, the secretary strove to hold some meetings requiring the GM’s attendance, 
but received refusals from the GM and some other senior managers.  When the 
disputes reached the higher authorities for judgment, the result was however not for 
the secretary.  The sales GM commented, “With the further acceleration of the 
external economic reform and the ideological shifts inside the government and 
individuals in society, we became more and more focused on business development 
economically but not politically.” 
 
There were also significant changes in the sub-departments’ appearance, functions and 
business activities after the restructuring.  The former production and technology 
department was consolidated into the subsidiaries based on the respective industries. 
“This can make the Company’s production and technological developments react 
more quickly to the market signals”, noted the GM.  
 
The former sales and outsourcing department was registered as a company with 
limited liability, under the parent company, to strive for new sales contracts.  The 
sales GM commented, “The purpose of transferring the department to become a 
company was fairly clear that we would be truly responsible for the sales income and 
our personal compensation was consequently bound tightly with the sales company’s 
performance.”  Although senior management designed a rather flexible income 
package for the salesmen through a one-on-one negotiating process at each year 
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beginning, the average yearly sales revenue and the average operating profits from the 
products were declining sharply from 1995 (see Figure 5.11).  The sales GM further 
commented, “Since the mid 1990s, we have faced extremely tough market conditions. 
On the one side, we saw increasing numbers of competitors, either local or overseas, 
occupy the market among our focusing industries. For example, the NingBo13 private 
manufacturers and Taiwan manufacturing enterprises occupied the plastic machinery 
industry in the early 1990s and became the market leader in the later 1990s. On the 
other side, we became no longer capable of gaining any support from the state in 
selling our products after the dual-track price system was functionalised from 
1992-1993. The conventional sales planning meeting held by the Ministry of 
Commerce became a sales promotion meeting in 1993 and was totally cancelled in 
1995.” 
 
Figure 5.11  The Company's financial performance from 1992-2001 
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Source: Adapted from the Company’s income statements from 1992-2001. 
                                                        
13 NingBo is a city in the ZheJiang District which has become the plastic production center of China 
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In 1991, the state granted the Company an independent export and import right which 
was considered fairly rare among SOEs in the early 1990s.  Meanwhile, after the 
new export and import department was established, except for a few exporting 
contracts made successfully with buyers from overseas, a large percentage of the 
department’s contribution to the business was through importing. However, the 
average gross profit margin of the importing business was only 2-5% over the period.  
 
For the human resource department, the major tasks over the period were resolving 
the re-employment problems of lay-offs, improving the quality of the workforce and 
assisting in establishing the new social pension and welfare system in the Company. 
One former senior manager commented, “Overstaffing was a long time internal 
problem among the Chinese SOEs that resulted in business low efficiency, also in the 
Company. As a SOE, we had to promise our staff an Iron Rice Bowl and care for them 
from cradle to grave. In the 1990s, the social burden status at the Company was about 
3000 to 3000, which means we had 3000 working employees to take care of 3000 
retirees or lay-offs. Furthermore, the number of lay-offs sharply increased after 1995 
when some of our joint ventures were broken up in discord and more of our product 
lines were spun-off. Many aging workers who failed to pass the qualification process 
implemented by the human resource department were required to go back home 
earlier than their retirement age. Meanwhile, the issue of stability is always of 
concern for us; we would have to take the burden through the re-employment process 
or afford the redundancy subsidies as the government required.”  
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Based on the 1992 Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, the 1993 and 2000 
Accounting Laws, and the 1994 Corporation Law, an auditing firm was appointed by 
the shareholders’ congress to be responsible for preparing the external financial 
reports for the Company at each year end.  The accounting and finance department 
became legally responsible for providing any accounting information required by the 
auditors during each audit.  The external reports include an income statement, a 
balance sheet, a cash flow statement and a two-year performance comparison analysis 
report (not compulsory).  The forms of these reports are similar to the reports under 
International Accounting Standards and have been further developed to resemble them 
even more.  Furthermore, a new computerised accounting system was established in 
the department in 1995 and all of the accounting information began to be processed 
through it.  
 
At the subsidiary level, after the senior management decided to delegate more 
autonomy to the factories in 1995, the heads of the 11 factories signed a responsibility 
contract each year with the parent company to operate independently with their own 
profits and losses.  Although this could be regarded as an extension of the former 
responsibility contract system, the certainty of realising autonomy among the factories 
was improved dramatically through the new contract system.  Furthermore, “the new 
contract was made on a more reasonable and negotiable basis, and the new senior 
managers became our team members and friends, compared with the old stubborn 
[predecessors],” commented one former head of the factory.  “Thus our goal became 
more aligned with the parent company. Also, we became more motivated since we 
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could design a better incentive compensation system by our own at the factory.”  
 
However, the reform of the subsidiaries did not bring the anticipated results since the 
level of competition far exceeded their imaginations.  The sales GM commented, 
“The competitive situation in the later 1990s was that the private sector provided 
similar quality machinery as we did but with much cheaper prices and imported 
machinery with higher prices but with much better quality. Especially, since 1997, the 
average cost of production per unit at the Company was 3 times higher than that at a 
private manufacturer. Consequently, we became a market loser.”   
 
The GM responded to the higher cost problem by making a “two in one out” decision 
at the end of 1997, noted one former vice GM who is an MBA graduate.  “Two 
means the purchase of the raw materials and the sale of the finished products, one 
means the production process; two in one out means we buy and we sell but they 
(external contracted private manufacturers) make.”  Although the GM received 
strong arguments from the other senior managers that the decision would result in 
business failure in the long run, the follow-up action was still taken under the GM’s 
powerful pressure in 1998.  Inevitably, the range of product lines continued to shrink 
and the number of lay-offs further increased.  However, it is interesting to note that 
the manufacturing costs did not correspondingly reduce and the total operating profits 
dropped into negative figures from 1998 to 2001 (see Figure 5.11).  The reason, 
according to one accounting interviewee, was that the Company as a SOE was unable 
to dismiss the lay-offs as easily as a private business could do and consequently had 
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to make redundancy payments similar to the annual wages for those lay-offs between 
1998 and 2000.  Therefore, the total cost of goods sold actually increased.  
 
From 1991 to 1993, three joint ventures were established at the Company through the 
endeavours of the former GM and the higher authorities.  However, except for the 
pharmacy machinery company with a controlling share of 43.29% (see Figure 5.10), 
jointly owned by a Singapore and a Taiwanese corporation, which has kept running so 
far, the other two joint ventures collapsed in 1994 and 1997 respectively.  The former 
chief accountant noted, “For the plastic machinery company, the Taiwanese came to 
us in 1992 since we just bought an advanced technology patent from overseas in 1991 
with a large amount of spending. When the value of the patent became low in terms of 
the new technology outstanding in 1994, the Taiwanese issued the dismissal of the 
joint venture in 1995. We lost USD 1.4 million from this joint venture. For the match 
machinery company, the Swedish came to us in 1991 since the competition of match 
consuming markets in Europe has been extremely dynamic. Although the joint venture 
had brought a large amount of cost savings to the foreign partners during the years, 
they were unable to accept the Chinese business models, in particular the Chinese 
managers’ low efficiency. Consequently, the Swedish bought out all our share in 
1997.” 
 
Moreover, the joint venture producing scanners, established in 1997, collapsed at the 
end of 1999 bringing a loss of around USD 2 .1 million to the Company.  The reason 
for the collapse was that the foreign owners conducted fraud, misappropriating the 
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joint funds.  
 
During the 1990s, the news in both the light industry magazines and the websites had, 
however, presented a fairly positive image of the Company.  It was one of the Top 
500 Chinese Biggest Enterprises in 1993 and ranked 144th of the 300 biggest stock 
enterprises in China.  Fifty products of the Company were awarded Shanghai 
tech-progress medals or excellent new-product medals, including two national silver 
quality medals and one national golden quality medal.  In 1998, the Company with 
its subsidiaries also passed the ISO9001:9002 Quality Management System Appraisal.  
However, all of these awards and improvements were merely on their appearance to 
the public and rarely reflected the actual economic situation inside the Company.  
One interviewee commented, “The majority of the quality improvements or the 
awards had not brought us a happy result. The fact was there were fewer customers 
interested in buying our products and more spin-offs of our low profitable product 
lines”. 
 
Based on the Company’s income statements from 1992 to 2001 released to the public 
(see Figure 5.11), the Company’s revenue from main operations had been decreasing 
dramatically since 1992 from annual RMB 350 million to average annual RMB 160 
million between 1997 and 2001.  In particular, the operating profits had become a 
negative figure since 1998.  However, the net profit before tax from 1992 to 2001 
had been kept at an average amount of RMB 20 million.  According to one 
accounting interviewee, the Company had kept on selling its land to bring the 
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business a pure income (recorded as the non-operating income) in each year since 
1996.14
 
The Company’s MAS during modernisation of enterprises: the modernisation of the 
MAS with a quality management approach 
 
As mentioned earlier, the emergence of the external competitive environment and the 
fall of the conventional command system over the 1990s had significantly impacted 
the Company’s financial performance and business sustainability, with the economic 
future of the Company becoming unpredictable.  With the modern enterprise regimes 
implemented at the Company, the formalisation of the accounting procedures and 
rules under the new corporate structure became a first priority in coping with the rapid 
changes in both the external and internal environment.  Meanwhile, with more 
emphasis being placed by senior management on profitability, quality and efficiency 
issues, a new quality management system focusing on more non-financial measures 
was established in 1996 to supplement the conventional financial-based MAS at the 
Company. Furthermore, the decentralisation of some functional departments (sales 
and production) and the delegation of more autonomy to the subsidiaries also brought 
changes in the budgeting control process as a part of the MAS improvements over the 
period. 
 
                                                        
14 In China, due to historical reasons, most of the SOEs have obtained free land in business from the state (People's 
Daily, 1993). 
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The formalisation of the accounting procedures and rules under the new corporate 
structure 
 
Since the new accounting standards and laws and the new company laws had been 
established or updated significantly by the state during the 1990s on a more 
internationally comparable basis, the process of formalising the accounting 
procedures and rules under the new corporate structure had been undertaken on a 
consistent basis after the Company went public.  The ongoing formalisation process 
over the period was also supported by the external professions who mainly came from 
the appointed auditing firm and the certified accountant institute.  Furthermore, the 
communication between the Company and the external professional institutions 
regarding the financial and business operation issues had been becoming increasingly 
frequent.  “The reform has brought us a closer tie with the external professional 
parties especially when the competitive environment becomes more dynamic,” 
commented the former chief accountant.  
 
The draft of the annual accounting management scheme was submitted by the 
accounting and finance department to the board of directors at the beginning of each 
year.  It covered: (1) the basic accounting management rules and procedures at the 
Company; (2) the accounting procedures and rules and methods of keeping 
accounting files in the computerised accounting system; (3) the internal auditing 
system and its functions; (4) the extensive accounting rules and procedures regarding 
management of various accounts; (5) the responsibility accounting rules and 
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procedures at the parent company and its subsidiaries; and (6) the sanction system at 
the Company.  After the endorsement of the chairman of the board of directors, the 
new rules and procedures became effective in the current year. “The formalisation 
process of the accounting management scheme is also a rationalised process and a 
modernised process. This process makes the business operation become more 
effective and legally enforceable,” commented the former chief accountant.  
 
The establishment of the new quality management system and its failure 
 
In 1993, faced with the situation that the conventional government support was 
coming to an end, the Company’s traditional massive quota production methods were 
replaced by the new quality-focused management system.  The system was designed 
through cooperation between the senior accountant staff and several external 
professional consultants. “The system,” noted accounting interviewees, “not only 
attempted to focus on quality and efficiency issues at the production level, but also 
headed towards an improvement in business operations at the managerial levels” (see 
Figure 5.12). 
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Figure 5.12  The quality management system at the Company during the 1990s 
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The quality management system, supplementary to the conventional responsibility 
contract system and controls, introduced more non-financial measures into the 
Company’s MAS.  This system, firstly, was promoting an organisation-wide process 
of professionalisations.  The individuals at various levels of the Company were 
encouraged to obtain relevant professional posts through the examinations set by the 
related professional institutes in different industries.  Even the secretary of the 
communist party committee and the head of the labour union had been granted a title 
of “senior political affairs profession” from the authorised institute.  Secondly, the 
rules and procedures were defined in the aforementioned annual management scheme 
and were required to be obeyed on a daily basis.  Thirdly, increasing numbers of 
technical training programs were launched, mainly at the operating and production 
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level.  Also, the workers would have to participate in the periodic technical 
qualification process prepared by the human resources department.  Fourthly, a 
scientific management approach based on “Taylorism” was adopted among the 
subsidiaries to improve production efficiency.  The vice-GM commented, “I learned 
Taylorism from my MBA study. Although this old model had lost its fashion a long 
time ago in the west, it however could be considered a useful tool here since most of 
our workers who were aging labourers had low motivation and lagged behind the 
competitive technical ranks. Especially the fact was we could not simply dismiss them 
but had to maintain as many as we could in terms of a certain social responsibility we 
had had. Therefore, the scientific approach might help to improve the level of 
efficiency in the first place by providing the workers a proper working method in 
accordance with the external competitive technical standards and motivate them to 
become more productive.”  Lastly, the system required all the products made by the 
subsidiaries to pass the strict local quality standard appraisal.  
 
The tasks of monitoring and evaluation were undertaken by the Company’s internal 
audit team formed by a group of senior management accounting staff.  However, one 
of the team members noted that there had been many conflicts from the 
implementation of the quality management system, in particular: (1) the conflict 
between the goal of efficiency and the concern of stability (the overstaffing issue); (2) 
the conflict between the goal of organisation-wide modernisation and the tendency to 
retain the old ways of doing things; and (3) the increasing conflicts of interest 
between the government and the managers or the managers and the subordinates, 
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resulting in goal incongruence.  Therefore, the level of effectiveness of 
implementing the quality management system over the period was low.  Moreover, 
the majority of the quality measures at the operating and production levels had been 
gradually abandoned after the GM declared the two-in-one-out strategic direction in 
1998.  
 
The changes in budgeting controls and personal income 
 
The decentralisation of some functional departments and the delegation of more 
autonomy to the subsidiaries had resulted in the Company’s budgeting becoming a 
bottom-up process. “The rapid increase in the level of competition and the dramatic 
reduction in the amount of support from the government had resulted in a higher and 
higher degree of difficulty in setting budgets over the period,” commented the former 
chief accountant.  “Our budgeting process was unable to keep the traditional 
top-down mode with the strict quota style. Senior management had been patiently 
participating in the budgeting meetings with the subordinates to discuss the issue of 
profitability in each business into the coming year. The follow-up control mechanisms 
had also been developed on the basis of linking the financial performance evaluations 
to an improved reward and bonus system.”  In 2000, the average annual personal 
income (salary plus bonus) became approximately USD 5,000 per year at the parent 
company, USD 3,500 per year at the fully-owned subsidiaries and USD 6,000 per year 
at the joint venture.  This is about a 14 times increase from the level of 1992 at the 
Company.  
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5.5 After privatisation: SLIMSC and the MAS (2002- ) 
 
At the social level: the post-WTO era 
 
With the arrival of the 21st century, one of the greatest milestones of China’s 
economic reform was the accession of China to the WTO in November 2001.  This 
significant event has not only further given a strong impetus to the acceleration of 
China’s economic reform but also impacted significantly on the nation’s ongoing 
changes in economic, legal, technological and political systems and even in social 
values in relationship to international rules and values (Green, 2003).  
 
A recent World Bank report (2003, p.3), published in the Development Research 
Center of the State Council of China, outlines four key measures currently 
characterising China’s economic development in the post-WTO period: (1) expansion 
of markets for exports; (2) increase in supply of exports into others’ markets; (3) 
competition in third markets; and (4) expansion of investment in China and, 
potentially, outward foreign investment from China.  This report also confirms that 
the level of competition in China’s internal market is dynamic.  
 
Meanwhile, another significant movement in China’s economy is the policy change 
on SOEs’ ongoing reform.  During the 1990s, the policymakers mainly focused on 
maintaining the emphasis on the big SOEs and gradually liberalising the small ones 
(Huang et al., 1998).  However, the continuously worsening performance of the 
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state-sector created a heavier burden for the state through a large numbers of subsidies 
(Keidel, 1998).  At the 1997 National People’s Congress, China’s leaders reaffirmed 
the state’s ongoing commitment to the privatisation of SOEs as the major task of 
ongoing economic restructuring (Chow et al., 2001).  Consequently, the reform 
policies regarding the privatisation of some big and unprofitable SOEs have been 
gradually established since 2000 and so far have been implemented on an 
experimental basis (Chen, 2004).  
 
At the organisation level: privatisation and massive spin-offs 
 
Starting from the middle of 2001, a group of people from a big private company in 
Beijing (the capital city of China), guided by some local government officers, came to 
the Company to discuss the possibility of acquiring the Company’s conventional 
non-current stocks held by the government.  In early 2002, after a considerable 
number of negotiation meetings had been held between the private investors and the 
government, the Company was finally sold through the agreed devolution of 53.58% 
of the shares (see Table 5.3) from the hands of governmental agencies to the private 
owners.  
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Table 5.3  The Company’s equity structure after the privatisation  
 
The private owners  The government  The social current stock holders 
               (Common individuals) 
 
53.58%    35%     11.42% 
 
Source: Adapted from the Company’s document 
 
As the above table indicates, 65% of the Company’s total shares are in the hands of 
private stock holders since the acquisition.  Although the government retains 35% of 
the total shares of the Company, an agreement was also signed between the private 
owners and the government stating that the government will not be involved in any 
ongoing business operations of the Company and only holds the right of sharing 35% 
of the annual residual income of the Company.  “This is an experimental method 
introduced in the newly established policy regarding the reform of the property rights 
of a Chinese SOE which prepares for privatisation,” noted the former chief 
accountant.  “Under this policy an absolute control right of the private owners of the 
Company is promised through the legal agreement.”  However, the author was not 
able to obtain further details of the agreement concerning the property rights issues 
for confidentiality reasons. 
 
After privatisation, the organisational chart retains its former modernised structure but 
the nature of authorities, functions and accountabilities under the structure is 
significantly redefined at the Company.  
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Since the government was no longer the boss of the Company, the former senior 
management team formed by the government was dismissed immediately after 
privatisation.  The departing senior managers included the former chairman of the 
board of directors, the former GM, the secretary of the communist party committee, 
the head of the labour union and one vice-GM.  Also, there has been no political 
department in the Company since then.  However, the sales GM and the chief 
accountant were retained since the private owners had strongly urged them to stay.  
It is interesting to note that even after the chief accountant resigned the job a year later, 
the Company’s employers still kept her position as part-time.  “They do so simply 
according to the person’s professional value to the business,” commented one 
interviewee.  “This is the basic principle constituted in the current business 
environment concerning employment issues.” 
 
Using the professional-value-based principle mentioned above, a massive downsizing 
program was carried out at the Company in 2002.  This program was implemented 
based on a competence report started three months before by an internal employee 
qualification appraisal team sent from the Beijing parent company. After the 
downsizing, the total number of employees was reduced from about 3000 to about 
1000.  For the redundant staff, the Company adopted the approach of 
“one-time-contract-out,” noted the former chief accountant.  “This approach is 
implemented under the revised Labour Act 1993 regarding the solution to the SOE 
lay-offs by establishing a legal contract between the employer and the redundant 
employees with an agreed amount of redundancy pay in accordance with the 
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standardised pay level set by law. This approach has been widely implemented in the 
non-state sector since the early 1990s but it is a fairly recent attempt in the state 
sector. Since the mobility of the current labour market is quite free, the redundant 
staff after the downsizing are quite capable of finding a new job. However, it is a 
critical change that the re-employment issue is no longer the responsibility of the 
Company’s private employers after the one-time-contract-out was made.”  In 
addition, there are significant reductions in the amount of payment to the retirees 
shared by the Company since the nation’s social welfare system has been further 
developed dramatically, according to one interviewee.  
 
Since 2002, the new chairman of the board of directors, who is also the current chief 
executive officer (CEO) of the Company, comes from the privately-owned trading 
company which also holds the majority of the shares of the parent company in Beijing. 
According to many of the interviewees, the chairman/CEO has been bringing a 
hands-on leadership style into the Company.  “She would pay attention to every 
single dollar amount of payment or income in the business and the concerns about 
profitability and efficiency have reached the strictest level in the Company’s history,” 
commented the interviewees.  
 
Among the senior management team, the current chief financial officer (CFO), who is 
a young professional (34 years old) with a doctoral degree, was head-hunted by the 
Company in mid-2002.  As soon as the CFO came to the position, an internal 
competitiveness investigation was carried out by the CFO and another newly 
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appointed senior manager to determine exactly the competitive situation of the 
Company, in particular the competitive capabilities of the sub-factories.  The result 
of the investigation, according to one accounting interviewee, alerted the Company to 
restructure promptly the business product lines, since most of them were posing a big 
threat to the business’s ongoing sustainability in the long run.  As a consequence, 10 
factories were forced to spin-off from 2002 to 2003, resulted in only one fully-owned 
manufacturing plant remaining.  Meanwhile, the Company recognises the long-term 
value of closer cooperation with the foreign partner of the Pharmacy joint venture 
company.  In 2003, the Company invested a huge amount of money in developing 
new products with the foreign partners.  This investment, according to one 
interviewee, might bring a five-year sustainable increase in income to the joint 
venture. 
 
Parallel to the massive spin-offs, a real estate company was registered under the 
Company in late 2002 to deal with the land developing business and real estate 
management business.  Furthermore, the exporting business became another major 
emphasis of the Company in coping with the current nation-wide export-orientated 
economy.  So far, the scope of the exporting business has been extended 
dramatically to various types of industrial and consumer products. “The dynamic 
business environment is still there but the way of managing business is changing after 
the privatisation,” commented the sales GM.  “The new business norm brought by 
the private owners is simply, ‘we do this as we think we might gain from this, and the 
decisions we made are based on cost vs. benefit evaluations of each case’. The norm 
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also applies to every individual at the Company since they consider they become 
better-off from the amount of work they contribute.” 
 
The current MAS at the Company: the establishment of a computer-based information 
system 
 
After privatisation, many of the conventional formalised accounting controls 
regarding accounting rules and procedures and the financial planning process have 
been retained at the Company under the modernised corporate structure.  However, 
there are at least two fundamental differences from the conventional practices.  
These are the level of effectiveness in setting up the control mechanisms in the 
business operation and the degree of competitive adaptability to the external 
dynamics.  
 
Since 2002, the chairman/CEO has divided the business into profit centers and 
non-profit centers.  Among the non-profit centers, which are mainly administrative, 
accounting & finance and rear-servicing departments, any dollar amount of spending 
is controlled tightly under two methods: (1) the compliance to budgets; and (2) the 
one-signature approach.  The compliance to budgets requires that every dollar 
amount of spending can only be incurred as the budgets require.  Overrunning the 
budget can only be authorised by the chairman/CEO.  According to one interviewee, 
the individual monthly salary at the non-profit centers is fixed but much higher than 
for the staff from the profit centers; in addition, the bonus for the non-profit staff is 
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determined to be double or triple the monthly pay payable at the year end.  For the 
profit centers, the control mechanisms are developed through the budget-based 
performance evaluation system and especially based on a “new reward philosophy”, 
the sales GM stated.  “The current reward and bonus system strongly promotes 
individual staff, especially salesmen, contributing more as the Company will 
recognise their achievement in a timely manner and compensate them accordingly. 
Under the reward system, a quarterly sales champion will be announced at the 
Company on a regular basis. ”   Although the Company adopts a confidentiality 
policy regarding the amounts of individual yearly salaries, the personal rewards in 
either dollar amount or other forms have been announced throughout the Company 
since 2003. 
 
In mid-2002, the Company established an organisation-wide computer-based 
management information system.  The paramount goals of the system, according to 
one interviewee, are creating interactive linkages with the external environment on the 
one hand, and strengthening the internal level of communication and cooperation on 
the other.  
 
Under this system, there is a website of the Company for external individuals to read 
about the Company’s present business operations and ongoing plans.  Also, there are 
three main linkages supported by the system, between the firm and customer, supplier 
and business partner sites.  The customer site, with the associated customer 
management team, focuses on recognising customer needs and improving customer 
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responsiveness.  The team members work closely with the profit center staff through 
meetings and reports.  The supplier site creates linkages with various external 
suppliers covering, for example, raw materials providers, contracted service firms and 
even job hunting firms.  The business partner site links to all allied business firms 
including the subsidiaries of the Company.  In particular, many relevant 
macro-economic data, such as new national policies, flow through the business 
partner channel from an allied data-collection company in Beijing to the Company.  
 
For internal communication and cooperation, the system encourages all individuals at 
the various level of the parent company to share business information on a daily basis.  
Furthermore, a data processing team at the Company is responsible for frequently 
inputting comprehensive information into the internal communication system.  This 
includes the Company’s strategic goals, the approved short-term and long-term 
business plans, the periodic financial performance comparison reports associated with 
corresponding extensive financial ratio analysis, the schedules of the current formal 
and informal meetings with possible subjects and the periodic results of highly 
performing staff and their rewards. 
 
According to one interviewee, in an organisation-wide meeting held in 2002, the CFO, 
who was the major proponent of establishing the system, pointed out that 
implementing the new management information system at the Company was 
important to bring the notion of strategic management into the business.  The CFO 
argued that the earlier management accounting practices at the Company were mainly 
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non-strategic in nature, resulting in most of the managerial actions taken being 
passive and strategically slow, whereas effecting business success in the present 
dynamic environment requires strategically proactive actions to be taken by the 
Company.  Also, the CFO criticised the extremely low level of information sharing 
among the corporate staff under the past modernised business structure, saying that it 
had resulted in the Company’s low efficiency and goal incongruence. 
 
So far, the implementation of the computer-based management information system 
and the new reward system has received the anticipated success at the Company. This 
can be seen both in the latest financial results of the Company, with a rapid increase 
in the revenue amounted to RMB 517 million and RMB 737 million in 2003 and 2004 
respectively, although the operating profits were still negative figures in 2003 and 
2004, and in the current staff’s confidence about the future of the business, revealed in 
the interviewees’ personal statements. 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
Following the model of dualism in Amat et al. (1994), this chapter has provided a 
comprehensive analysis of the MAS change undertaken in SLIMSC from 1956 to 
2004.  In the four stages during this period, many relevant historical events emerging 
at both the social and organisational levels were detailed, tracing cause-and-effect 
linkages to the new MAS in SLIMSC in the four periods.  The findings indicate that 
although the majority of the MAS change in SLIMSC was in response to the 
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Company’s adaption to external changes, there were also internal effects on the MAS 
change purposefully initiated by senior management, acting in a process of “planned 
innovation” (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996, p.14), for example, the establishment of a 
computer-based management information system in SLIMSC recently.  As argued by 
Amat et al. (1994), these double-sided effects on MAS change should be taken into 
account when explaining the process of design, implementation and change of MAS.  
The next chapter will discuss the double-sidedness of the MAS change in SLIMSC 
(see Chapter 6.2.3), and identify the possible key explanatory indicators, at both the 
social and organisational levels, affecting the progressive formalisation of the MAS in 
SLIMSC over the period studied.  Also, the conclusion will produce a new 
generalised model of the contextual aspects of MAS change as seen in SLIMSC. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the possible effect of changing factors at social and 
organisational levels on the MAS change in SLIMSC from 1956 to 2004.   Three 
outer, social factors (socio-economic condition, competition and socio-culture) and 
three inner, organisational ones (autonomy, profitability and authority) have greatly 
impacted on the progressive formalisation of the MAS in SLIMSC during the period 
studied.  Also, the internal effects on the MAS change differ from the external ones, 
mostly reflecting SLIMSC’s increasingly specialised managers having exercised a set 
of proactive or intentional changes on the MAS within the corporate boundary.  In 
addition, this study identifies differences between SLIMSC and DERESA (the 
company studied by Amat et al., 1994), because of different political environments, 
different changes in business scale, different amounts of autonomy obtained by the 
companies and different focuses on their own economic development.   
 
6.2 The case of SLIMSC 
 
Amat et al.’s (1994) model of dualism arose from an analysis of MAS change based 
on a process view, linking the interactions of social and organisational dynamics.  
The model can be used in this case to show why and how the processes of 
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introduction, design and implementation of new MAS have been taking place at 
SLIMSC over the last more than forty years.  In accordance with Scapens and 
Roberts’ (1993) viewpoint, many historical contingencies that emerged within and 
outside SLIMSC have been reported in the case study, presenting cause-and-effect 
contextual linkages to the existence of or change in the forms that the MAS took in the 
four different periods.  This case also reveals that some interrelated factors at both the 
social and organisational levels have impacted significantly on the progressive 
formalisation of the MAS in SLIMSC from 1956 to 2004.   
 
6.2.1 Key factors at the social level 
 
The key explanatory indicator at the social level is the gradual transformation of 
China’s economy from a closed, socialistic, planned economy to an open 
market-orientated economy.  This socio-economic change partly explains why 
SLIMSC has undertaken organisational change processes as well as why the MAS has 
changed as it has over the period.   
 
Parallel to the nation-wide economic transformation, the notion of competition 
emerged in Chinese society, the level of competition becoming more and more 
dynamic owing to increasing pressures both locally and overseas as accelerations of 
economic reform took place.  As SLIMSC had been striving to raise its level of 
competitiveness, reactively, since the mid-1990s, at the same time and as a 
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consequence many new management accounting techniques and control mechanisms 
have been introduced and implemented on an increasingly formalised basis.   
 
The process of socio-cultural shift among individuals in Chinese society during the 
period is another powerful indicator.  Tian (1997) argued that Chinese economic 
liberalisation has not only brought the people more economic freedom and individual 
independence, but also greatly changed the people’s values, thinking and behaviour.  
He further noted that during the reform period, Chinese people “have gradually come to 
realise that self-interest is an inevitable part of human behaviour… [and] they work 
hard and effectively because they work for themselves” (p.231).  This is exactly what 
has happened among SLIMSC people over the last more than forty years.  The 
findings show that there are significant differences in societal attitudes between the old 
and new upper authorities (chairmen of the board of directors, GMs) and among the 
subordinates toward the Company’s development, business success, managerial 
achievement, authority, class structure, self-recognition, personal compensations, etc.  
In particular, the current SLIMSC people are concerned mostly about self-beneficial 
consequences and favour little the collective value initiated in the former closed 
society.  This process of socio-cultural change among SLIMSC people in the period 
studied explicitly indicates a movement from collective interest to individualistic 
interest.  This is also in accordance with Green’s (2003) view, arguing that the 
socio-cultural shift in China’s society is a process of change from the traditional 
societal values to international ones.  Consequently, SLIMSC managers, accountants 
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and other individuals who held a different way of thinking and subsequently adopted a 
different way of doing things were, in turn, designing and implementing different 
forms of MAS and control mechanisms (e.g. the increasingly budget-orientated 
performance measurement and compensation systems in SLIMSC since the 1980s) to 
cope with the changing needs, thinking and behaviour (Gray, 1988).   
 
However, the findings are limited to SLIMSC alone, whereas determination of the 
impact of such a comprehensive social factor on MAS change in China requires a wider 
range of evidence and in different types of organisation.  This study argues that the 
impact of the socio-cultural shift in China on the MAS change in SLIMSC does exist 
and there is scope for future studies to extend the findings.  
 
The findings also reveal that there were other external factors impacting on the MAS 
change at some particular points in time.  For instance, the introduction of information 
technology during the mid-1990s in China resulted in the establishment of the 
Company’s computer-based accounting system as well as the management information 
system.  Also, the establishment of stock markets in China during 1991-1992 impacted 
on the Company’s corporate structure as well as the financial accounting system.  
These other external factors could be compiled into a list of relevant external 
contingencies (Haldma and Lääts, 2002) adding to the contingency theory literature, 
which does not view the nature of social, organisational and MAS change as a 
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continually correlated process (Soin et al., 2002).  However, this is beyond the scope 
of this study.   
 
6.2.2 Key factors at the organisational level 
 
Changing factors at the organisational level are summarised in Table 6.1.  The key 
explanatory indicator at the organisational level is the increase in SLIMSC’s 
autonomy.  Over the period from 1956 to 2004, the Company had transformed from 
a totally government controlled workshop to a solely independent economic entity.  
The change in SLIMSC’s autonomy partly explains why the Company has gradually 
placed stronger emphasis on its own economic development, resulting in a continuous 
extension in demand for management accounting information as well as a progressive 
formalisation of the MAS.  In accordance with the change, SLIMSC as a whole has 
moved away from “closed” operations to “open” ones recently (Bartol et al., 2001, 
p.51), interacting more with the external environment.  
 
Parallel to the organisational changes, the notion of profitability emerged in SLIMSC 
due to the implementation of the new profit-retention program during the 1980s; 
subsequently the issue of profitability became the central concern in SLIMSC in order 
to achieve the goals of business survival and competitive success.  Most importantly, 
the focus on profitability explains why SLIMSC managers, responding to external 
pressures, increasingly exercised a set of proactive actions taken since the 1980s (e.g. 
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the profit/investment plans in the 1980s, the strategic actions taken linking short-term 
and long-term economic improvements in the 1990s, the internal competitiveness 
project in mid-2002, etc), and consequently established and implemented a more 
effective MAS over the period (Gray and Roberts, 1991; Scapens and Roberts, 1993; 
Amat et al., 1994).    
 
Table 6.1  The changing organisational context  
 
Stage 1956-1981 1981-1991 1991-2002 2002-the present 
Organisation 
and its 
autonomy 
A SOE 
The workshop with 
no autonomy 
 
 
 
 
No emphasis on own 
economic 
development 
A closed system 
A SOE 
The management 
responsibility 
contract system and 
increases in its 
autonomy 
 
Little emphasis on 
own economic 
development 
A closed system 
A listed SOE 
The modernised 
enterprise system 
and continual 
increases in its 
autonomy 
 
More emphasis on 
own economic 
development 
A semi-open system 
A listed private firm 
Improvements in the 
modernisation process, 
massive downsizing & 
spin-offs and full 
autonomy 
 
Full emphasis on own 
economic development 
 
An open system 
Orientation The production plan  
 
 
 
Production-focused 
The quota profit 
 
 
 
Productivity-focused 
Profit, but also 
concerned about 
social 
responsibility 
Quality-focused 
Profitability as the only 
promise for business 
survival and competitive 
success 
Competitiveness-focused 
Management 
and authority 
A group of foremen 
 
Low educational and 
professional level 
A group of contractors 
 
An improvement in 
educational and 
professional level 
A group of agents  
 
Specialised 
professionals 
The private owners 
 
Specialised professionals 
 
Similarly, the changing nature of authority in SLIMSC can be considered as another 
important explanatory indicator.  Over the period from 1956 to 1991, the senior 
managers who were less specialised professionals mostly followed governmental 
instructions carefully, and they had little innovative thought of the Company’s own 
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economic development as well as few plans for innovative change in the MAS.  Since 
the 1990s, when the Company became increasingly exposed to market competitions, in 
particular when it became privatised, business authority was transferred to a group of 
specialised professionals who have continuously established the new MAS as a means 
of reaching attainment of the goal of competitive success. 
 
6.2.3 The double sidedness effects on the MAS change in SLIMSC and the six 
multiple variables  
 
The social and organisational changing factors illustrate that the MAS change was as a 
response to the Company’s adaption to external changes on the one hand, and was also 
a consequence of a set of internal proactive actions taken by SLIMSC managers on the 
other (Amat et al., 1994).  In particular, the three organisational effects indicate the 
movement to an increasing focus on SLIMSC’s own economic development within the 
corporate boundary.  Hence, the case further illustrates that the interaction of three 
outer factors (socio-economic condition, competition and socio-culture) with three 
inner ones (autonomy, profitability and authority) greatly impacted on the 
introduction, implementation and change of the Company’s MAS during 1956-2004. 
Following Amat et al.’s (1994) approach, the six elements can be taken together, 
constituting a continuum whose extremes and middle point are shown in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1  MAS and outer and inner variables in SLIMSC 
 
Outer variables: Social  
  
Socio-economic condition Socialistic       Market-orientated 
Competition    None            Dynamic 
Socio-culture    Collective interest      Individualistic interest 
       Inner variables: Organisational  
 
Autonomy    No         Full 
Profitability    No    High    Low 
Authority     Governmental       Professionalism 
       MAS  
 
Informal                Formalised 
 
 
On the left side of the continuum is summarised the condition of SLIMSC during 
1956-1981.  At the social level, China ran its economy under the socialistic planned 
economic model; there was no certain market for trade, and no opportunity for 
competition.  The Chinese people (SLIMSC people) were paid at an equalised wage 
and viewed political achievements and collective interest as vital in their careers.  
 
At the organisational level, SLIMSC ran like a workshop of the state in accomplishing 
the quantitative-based production plan.  Certainly no autonomy existed at this stage. 
The notion of profitability also did not exist as the state would collect all annual 
revenue and surplus from SLIMSC.  The superior control power was given to the 
Company’s communist party committee; the managers had no say over daily operations 
but only followed the instructions given by the higher authorities.    Hence, there was 
no need for SLIMSC to adopt any formalised management accounting techniques for 
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its own economic development, and the accountants were working under the unified 
financial accounting system set by the state to carry out book-keeping tasks.  
 
In the next period, 1981-1991, China stepped into the early reform era.  At the social 
level, China gradually opened its doors to the external world, granted more autonomy 
to the SOEs and developed an embryonic form of the market.  Although the notion of 
competition correspondingly emerged in the economy, the level of competition was 
extremely low due to the nation’s economy still running under the former command 
system.  In addition, there were scarcities of both industrial and consumer goods and 
raw materials in the period.   Although the majority of the Chinese people (including 
SLIMSC people) during the period still favoured the collective interest and considered 
money as not everything, there was certainly a tendency towards cultural change in 
society as the nation began to pay more attention to social developments economically 
rather than politically.  
 
At the organisational level, there was an extension of SLIMSC autonomy in deciding 
its own economic development since the management responsibility contract system 
was further established and implemented in the Company.  The notion of profitability 
emerged at the Company due to the implementation of the profit-retention program, 
and subsequently the Company enjoyed a period of high profitability as a result of 
strong governmental support and the low level of competition.  Also, lured by the 
benefits from the external larger demand due to the scarcities, SLIMSC decided to 
enhance the level of productivity by acting on the technological improvements.  In 
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addition, the managers in SLIMSC obtained more political and economic powers to 
control the business operations.  Also, managerial decision-making was undertaken on 
an increasingly professionalised basis.  Inevitably, managerial know-how and level of 
education were emphasised more by SLIMSC.  
 
Consequently, there came the first stage of formalising the MAS in SLIMSC through 
the establishment and implementation of the new financial management system to cope 
with the external and internal changing factors during the period.  Although the goal 
and role of the new system mainly favoured the governmental interest, there was still a 
movement towards improving SLIMSC’s own economic development and individual 
compensation.  In particular, in the 1980s, SLIMSC began to incorporate some 
westernised management accounting methods into the decision-making process, 
investing in new projects with its own funds.  In addition, the facilitation of the new 
legitimised financial accounting rules and procedures also supplemented the MAS 
formalisation process over the period.  
 
During the next period, 1991-2002, China’s economy was stepping into the critical 
transformation period.  At the social level, the market-orientated economy gradually 
replaced the former planned one, and accelerations of China’s economic reform 
brought a large amount of foreign investments and imports into the local market.  As 
a result, the nation’s competitive environment became dynamic in the later 1990s.  
During the period, there was also an explicitly socio-cultural shift toward 
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individualistic values and interest among the Chinese people (and SLIMSC people), 
as China became a more open society and the people became more economically 
independent.  For example, there was a large increase in numbers of private firms 
and other non-state organisations in China during the 1990s.  
 
At the organisational level, the restructuring process toward the modernised corporate 
structure took place when SLIMSC went public.  However, the modernised SLIMSC 
at this stage had not prepared enough for confronting the external competitive 
pressures when the governmental support vanished in 1995.  As a result, business 
profitability continuously decreased; in particular, SLIMSC operating profits had 
become negative by 1998.  Furthermore, many long hidden problems such as the 
social burden of redundancy payments and the low quality product lines, were 
surfacing and SLIMSC was struggling for business survival from the mid-1990s.  In 
addition, collapses of several of the joint-ventures during the period pushed SLIMSC 
into a worsening situation.  However, the autonomy of SLIMSC had been further 
extended tremendously in this period so that the top managers could make a broader 
number of independent decisions on the business operations.  Also, the 
governmental authority had been transferred from the political agents in SLIMSC to 
the increasingly specialised managers, and coordination with external professional 
institutions had also been undertaken on a more frequent basis.  
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Consequently, there came the second stage of formalising the MAS in SLIMSC 
through the establishment and implementation of the new legitimised financial 
accounting rules and procedures on a more internationally comparable basis, the new 
quality management system focusing on long term economic development and the 
new budget-based performance measurement and compensation systems in order to 
effectively motivate and control the staff who had changing values, thinking and 
behaviour.   
 
The right side of the continuum summarises the condition of SLIMSC since 2002.  
At the social level, China’s market-orientated economy has reached a mature stage 
and the competitive environment has become more dynamic since the accession of 
China to the WTO has resulted in more overseas imports and investments flooding 
into the market.  Socially, individuals strongly favour individualistic interest.  They 
(SLIMSC people) work harder because they want to earn more for themselves and 
they have adopted the cost-benefit evaluation model to guide their follow-up actions.  
 
At the organisational level, SLIMSC became a fully independent business entity when 
it was privatised in 2002.  Meanwhile, profitability is still low even though SLIMSC 
has undertaken massive business restructuring during 2002-2003.  The authority in 
SLIMSC is no longer governmental but has all transferred to the private owners and 
the new specialised managers.  As a result, there came the third stage of formalising 
the MAS in SLIMSC, involving restructuring of the budget-based performance 
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measurement and compensation systems of the 1990s, and establishing and 
implementing the computer-based management information system in 2003.  
 
6.3 Comparison with the case of DERESA 
 
The case of SLIMSC further confirms the significant impact of three of the social and 
organisational change factors (change in the level of competition, change in 
profitability, and change in authority) on MAS change, as identified in DERESA by 
Amat et al. (1994).  Also, this study, under the notion of dualism, further confirms 
that there are double-sidedness effects on MAS change as Amat et al. (1994) argued. 
For instance, the establishment of a computer-based management information system 
in SLIMSC partly resulted from external competitive pressures on the Company’s 
survival, and was partly initiated purposefully by a group of specialised managers, 
acting on a planned innovation in aiming at strategic success.  
 
However, this study identifies three new change factors at the social and 
organisational levels: the socio-economic transformation, the socio-cultural shift and 
the increasing amount of autonomy, all of which had a tremendous effect on the 
progressive formalisation of the MAS in SLIMSC, in contrast with DERESA.  
Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 2, during the period of economic change in 
China, the political system remained the same.  Therefore, the changes observed 
were not as a result of political change.  In contrast, DERESA illustrates the 
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important impact of the increasingly democratic political control in Spain on the MAS 
change.  Also, SLIMSC was not concerned with profits in the 1956-1981 period in 
contrast to DERESA which enjoyed high profitability in the first stage of the MAS 
change.  
 
Among other explicit differences between the two companies, SLIMSC started as a 
big SOE whereas DERESA began as a small family-like business.  The business 
scale of SLIMSC has been constantly shrinking whereas DERESA experienced 
continuous expansion in its business over the period studied.  Also, SLIMSC has 
gradually developed an emphasis on its own operating improvements whereas 
DERESA, as an independent economic entity since the beginning, had always 
concentrated on its own economic development.  In this respect, the managerial 
proactive actions taken in DERESA, such as the heavy focus on R&D in designing 
leading quality products, was exercised earlier and on a more innovative basis than in 
SLIMSC.  As a result, the internal effects on the MAS change, characterised by 
intentional forces to adopt and change the new MAS, were stronger in DERESA than 
in SLIMSC.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this study confirms the effectiveness of the model of dualism by 
linking the interactions of social and organisational dynamics in analysing the MAS 
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change in a Chinese company over the last more than forty years.  This study also 
recognises the importance of the dualistic nature of organisations and MAS change in 
organisations.  This confirms Amat et al.’s (1994) argument that the dualistic nature 
of MAS change rejects any one-sided deterministic solution by “stressing the existence 
[of] or change in MAS as the consequence of either external or internal factors to the 
organisation” (p.118).  Furthermore, the model helps to conceptualise the process of 
change in MAS in the context of rapidly changing nations since in those contexts 
there is likely to be a continuously correlated process of change in societies, in 
organisations and in the MAS in organisations.   
 
This study concludes that there are three outer factors (socio-economic condition, 
competition and socio-culture) and three inner ones (autonomy, profitability and 
authority) which had an enormous effect on the MAS change in SLIMSC during 
1956-2004.  This study also endorses Amat et al.’s (1994) model of dualism, and 
shows that there is scope for more studies of contextual aspects of MAS change in 
rapidly changing nations.  
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